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1. A radical new approach, to regulating the 
world primary-commodity markets is essential; 
without it the political and economic conse-
quences could be disastrous. 
For decades now world trade has been in a 
state of transition and its functions have been 
changing both for the primary-commodity ex-
porting countries and the industrialized States. 
These changes have not been brought about by 
new trading methods but they are the result of 
a radical transformation of the political and 
economic structures of the world-a process 
stimulated by two world wars. 
The most obvious outcome of this trans-
formation has been the emergence of a new 
world economic factor: deve{opment policy. Its 
aim is to speed up the changes in the structure 
of the world's economy and to give the primary 
exporting countries a broader production basis 
and hence a more secure position in the world's 
trade. 
2. Not every type of trade policy assistance or 
primary-commodity market stabilization mea-
sure will achieve this end. They may even have 
the opposite effect, that is of consolidating ob-
solete production structures and hindering de-
velopment. This possibility should not be over-
looked when measures, specifically directed at 
stabilizing primary-commodity markets are 
taken. 
The market problem facing the developing 
countries is less important than the problem of 
structures. 
3. The world's economy has changed as a re-
sult of a radical transformation of the world's 
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political structure. The main feature-from a 
structural viewpoint-of former world trade 
conditions was the fact that the powers which 
were politically and economically preponderant, 
i. e. the industrialized countries of Europe, were 
dependent on world trade. The dependence of 
former world powers on imports of foodstuffs 
and raw materials was a constant stimulus to 
world trade; this indeed was the origin of world 
trade and the fact that it was these countries 
that established the rules of world trade. Neither 
the raw materials for their industries nor the 
foodstuffs for their people were to be fourui in 
sufficient quantity within their own frontiers and 
they naturally had no tropical produce. Indeed, 
world trade was geared to the needs of the 
Northern Hemisphere, a situation consolidated 
by the colonial system. 
4. The new world powers-the USA and the 
USSR-play quite a different part in terms of 
world trade to-day. Both are of continental size 
and stretch from the extreme North down into 
the sub-tropical latitudes. The USA has sufficient 
raw materials to last her until at least the year 
2000 and produces certain major tropical pro-
ducts within her own frontiers. The USSR differs 
only in respect of its degree of economic deve-
lopment. 
The function of foreign trade as far as the 
former world powers, i. e. the European States, 
were concerned has been established. For the 
USA and the USSR, however, it is made to serve 
a different purpose. Half the USA's imports 
come from the American continent and over one 
third of the USA's exports go back to the Ameri-
can continent. Three-quarters of the USSR's 
foreign trade is with Communist states. As a 
result of the division of work entailed by the 
continental-like size of these two world powers, 
their volume of foreign trade is no more than 
3 to 5 °/o of the gross national product and is well 
below the foreign trade to G.N.P. ratio of the 
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major European States which is still between 
10 and 20 °/o. Hence the USA and the USSR to-
day are more interested in trade with the highly 
industrialized States than the European coun-
tries were or are. Structurally, they are less 
dependent on the North-South trade stream; 
they even compete in respect of some products 
with the primary exporting countries. 
The decolonization process has no doubt been 
accelerated by the positions that the USA and 
the USSR have assumed in world affairs since 
1945 and by the fact that unlike the European 
countries, they are economically independent of 
the Southern Hemisphere. The dominant posi-
tions of the USA and the USSR and the decolo-
nization process have introduced two important 
new factors into the structure of the world's 
economy: 
(a) The primary exporting countries no longer 
play a passive part in world trade. Economic 
and political subordination to the interests of 
former colonial powers is no longer the ruling 
factor. It is rather their own political auto-
nomy which is the main concern and this 
pre-supposes a minimum of econmic auto-
nomy. 
(b) Decolonization has made European economies 
more self-centred; they are beginning to 
unite in order to adjust themselves to the 
size of the USA and the USSR and pursue an 
independent policy. Western Europe which 
has the economic dimensions of a continent, 
has also, thanks to technical progress (more 
efficient use of raw materials, development 
of substitute products, better farming tech-
niques), been able to effect a division of work 
within an internal market that (subject to 
limitations) has been nearly as far-reaching 
as that of the USA. 
5. The new situation resulting from the exis-
tence of two economic world powers that are 
almost wholly independent of primary-commo-
dity imports and able to effect the best possible 
division of work, and a third power in embryo, 
which is still dependent on raw material im-
ports, has affected the former primary exporting 
colonies in two ways: 
(a) positively, in that because the Northern He-
misphere is less dependent economically on 
the Southern Hemisphere, conditions have 
been favourable to the latter's political in-
dependence; 
(b) negatively, because the increased political 
independence of the countries of the North-
ern Hemisphere has aggravated the trade 
policy situation of the Southern Hemisphere. 
6. For a long time yet the dominant feature of 
world trade is going to be the extensive or in-
creasing self-sufficiency of the major trading 
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powers. The process of regional integration, un-
der way since 1945 in Europe as well as in the 
Southern Hemisphere, is evidence of this new 
development. 
II - Stabilizing primary-commodity markets 
7. A policy directed at stabilizing the commo-
dity markets must take all these facts into ac-
count. Its primary aim should be to diversify 
the production structures of present primary ex-
porting countries in order to promote greater 
trade between these countries themselves, for 
this is a prerequisite of their economic and poli-
tical stability. This is the end towards which 
any sound development policy should be di-
rected. 
All measures to stabilize the existing markets 
must be subject to certain limitations: their pur-
pose must not be to consolidate existing trade 
structures and trends but, in fact, to transform 
them, they must promote the economic develop-
ment of the countries in the Southern Hemis-
phere. 
8. The EEC has a special responsibility-as 
will the united Europe of the future-for Euro-
pean integration imposes a new responsibility on 
the EEC in regard to world trade. Moreover, the 
economic and political stability of primary ex-
porting countries is still far closer to the Euro-
pean interest than to that of the world powers. 
The question of stabilizing primary-commodity 
prices illustrates· to what extent the issue in-
volved is a political one. 
9. Attempts to stabilize prices are not incon-
sistent with current practice in world trade and 
they can take the shape of domestic or, alter-
natively, of international measures. Govern-
ments can intervene on their domestic markets 
to sustain or stimulate uncompetitive production 
(e. g. agriculture or coal); they can also intervene 
on the international tin, wheat, sugar and coffee 
markets and, in another form, on the oil market. 
In both cases, action flows from political de-
cisions and reflects political and economic in-
terests and power. Prices may be stabilized 
where there is sufficient economic power to 
bear the costs, and sufficient political power to 
impose the relevant decisions-that is in pros-
perous and politically powerful countries and on 
world markets when the influence of any coun-
try or economic group is strong enough and 
when it has sufficient economic and political 
resources to carry through the stabilization of 
prices. 
The point at issue is not the principle itself 
but the possibility of its implementation. Econo-
mic weakness invariably attracts support action 
when it is in the general interest, or to assist 
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8. The EEC has a special responsibility-as 
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pean integration imposes a new responsibility on 
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economic and political stability of primary ex-
porting countries is still far closer to the Euro-
pean interest than to that of the world powers. 
The question of stabilizing primary-commodity 
prices illustrates· to what extent the issue in-
volved is a political one. 
9. Attempts to stabilize prices are not incon-
sistent with current practice in world trade and 
they can take the shape of domestic or, alter-
natively, of international measures. Govern-
ments can intervene on their domestic markets 
to sustain or stimulate uncompetitive production 
(e. g. agriculture or coal); they can also interveJ:?.e 
on the international tin, wheat, sugar and coffee 
markets and, in another form, on the oil market. 
In both cases, action flows from political de-
ClSIOns and reflects political and economic in-
terests and power. Prices may be stabilized 
where there is sufficient economic power to 
bear the costs, and sufficient political power to 
impose the relevant decisions-that is in pros-
perous and politically powerful countries and on 
world markets when the influence of any coun-
try or economic group is strong enough and 
when it has sufficient economic and political 
resources to carry through the stabilization of 
prices. 
The point at issue is not the principle itself 
but the possibility of its implementation. Econo-
mic weakness invariably attracts support action 
when it is in the general interest, or to assist 
or re-introduce certain productions at certain 
economic sectors, that is where it is, or can be, 
argued that it is politically or economically de-
sirable to stabilize the market. 
10. Hence the question arises as to whether, 
and if so where, stabilizing the primary-com-
modity markets is in the general interest, in 
other words whether this is generally recognized 
and whether any consequent action is possible. 
In whose interest is it-apart from the coun-
tries liable to be adversely affected-to support 
the primary-commodity markets? 
The USA, which has the political stability of 
the world at heart, has political reasons for 
doing so (admittedly, however, her strategic re-
serve policy has often had side-effects that have 
seriously shaken world trade); but, economically, 
her interests do not coincide completely, if at all. 
If certain Southern Hemisphere competitors 
were given backing and support, various Ameri-
can sectors (fats, sundry minerals) might suffer. 
The USA is, to a large extent, independent of 
raw materials imports. Europe, on the other 
hand, could not, if the need arose, cover some of 
its own primary-commodity requirements from 
domestic sources. It is no accident that it is in 
Europe that world trade is at its briskest, for 
Europe is, to a much larger extent, structurally 
dependent on world trade. It is this dependence 
on supplies that accounts for the basic difference 
between the Community and the USA in terms 
of trade policy. 
For oil, for example, Europe is wholly de-
pendent on imports, and oil is a vital raw ma-
terial. The practical implications of this are sig-
nificant, for the colonia era is now over and 
Europe will never again either want or be able 
to secure its imports through a political hold on 
the States concerned, i. e. through an imperialist 
policy. 
11. This has produced a .fundamental change 
in the aims of European policy. The USA and 
the USSR could, if necessary, withdraw again 
into economic isolation,--Europe can not. In so 
far as Europe depends on imports of key primary 
commodities and cannot, or will not, protect its 
external trade interests by an imperial policy, 
it will have political and economic motives for 
securing the stability of the States with which 
it is so closely bound; and it can only contribute 
to such stability through a comprehensive and 
concentrated external trade and development 
policy. 
III - Commercial.policy and development 
policy 
12. Structural policy is even more important 
for the developing countries than market and 
price policy. The crux of the problem ~show to 
change their production structures since these 
are no longer adjusted to the new world political 
and economic situation. 
How can such an adjustment best be achiev-
ed? GATT is, and will remain, a valuable tool 
for freeing world trade from unnecessary res-
trictions. However, sight must not be lost of the 
fact that this agreement was entered into by 
countries that were able to compete with each 
other economically and experience has shown 
that only prosperous nations profit by the free-
ing of world trade. 
As long as there is a marked disparity be-
tween the degree of economic progress of the 
developing countries and that attained by the 
developed countries, the former will be unsuit-
able for a liberalization of the traditional type. 
Indeed, the contracting parties to GATT being 
industrialized countries, they conceded each 
other rules and regulations that provide for 
exemptions in those branches of production 
where their competitive capability is unequal 
(e. g. in agriculture). 
13. GATT's new Chapter 4 is designed to 
bring the agreement closer into line with the 
special needs of the developing countries and as 
such is a definite step in the right direction. 
However, one should ensure from the very start 
that the regulations providing for exemptions 
do not lead to restrictions such as those intro-
duced in connexion with agriculture. It should 
also be pointed out that undue emphasis has 
been put on commercial policy measures under 
GATT. The real answer to the problem of 
primary-commodity markets lies in an expansion 
of the economic bases of the producer countries. 
To achieve this, commercial policy measures, 
whatever their extent, would be inadequate: the 
developing countries must change their produc-
tion structures and develop trade among them-
selves. As for the developed countries, they must 
help speed up this process by adjusting to it 
their industries and agriculture and providing 
the necessary financial resources; the Yaounde 
Convention is certainly the first step towards 
this end. 
14. GATT, regional groupings and the special-
ized agencies of the United Nations-in parti-
cular the World Conference on Trade and De-
velopment-must be complementary to one 
another for this purpose, each having its specific 
task. Whether this would produce world-wide 
action over the long term would depend on the 
prosperous countries rather than on the deve-
loping countries. It is for the Community to take 
the initiative, for it is particularly in its inte-
rest that the nations of the Southern Hemisphere 
should continue to develop since the Commu-
nity has heavier obligations in this respect. 
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The problem of the primary-commodity mar-
kets has been tackled far too often from a trade 
policy angle. The report that follows endeavours 
to describe the political factors which are often 
at the root of trade policy and to indicate a num-
ber of important action possibilities in the poli-
tical sphere; in no way does it claim to be a com-
plete analysis. 
It is based on the principle that political 
rather than purely economic decisions must 
determine the action taken by the industrialized 
countries. The aim of this report is therefore to 
stimulate a Community policy that meets these 
requirements. 
CHAPTER I 
The effects of the 1914-18 war on world trade 
and how these effects were absorbed 
15. Commerce between nations in the 19th 
Century grew up on the principle of free trade, 
a principle eclipsed by the 1914-18 War. This 
eclipse led in turn to the world's economy going 
off the gold standard. Attempts were made after 
the war to re-establish the pre-war pattern; but 
they soon proved in vain. Relations between the 
nations had changed too radically to permit any 
return either to free trade or to the gold stand-
ard. . 
16. Before the 1914-18 war, London was the 
world's political, economic and financial centre; 
it was largely able to dictate the pattern of 
world trade. As the 19th century progressed, 
more and more countries turned their backs on 
the economic independence that was within 
their grasp simply because world trade was so 
unrestricted. They gradually began to obtain 
their supplies from abroad. The 1914-18 war and 
its aftermath, especially the economic crisis that 
rocked the world in the thirties, forced these 
countries to find new sources of supply, either 
at home or in regions where they had a solid 
footing; their motives were strategic, fearing 
that their sources of supply might be cut off, or 
economic, where currency difficulties were the 
operative factor. The industrialized countries 
began encouraging domestic agriculture while 
their former suppliers of agricultural products 
and raw materials began to industrialize. 
17. The latter sought, where they could, to 
meet their own needs in terms of industrial pro-
ducts and, whereas the way work had once been 
divided in the world had led them to export 
primary commodities, they now began to process 
these at home before exporting them as fi-
nished products. At the same time, the industria-
lized countries sought to produce their own food-
stuffs and to find the raw materials they needed 
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within their own frontiers, as well as continuing 
to export manufactured goods. 
18. Sweden and Finland, for example, had ex-
ported wood; now they began processing wood 
and exporting it as semi-finished and finished 
products like cellulose and paper. Linen produc-
tion in Central Europe developed to the stage 
where there w~s a surplus over domestic needs 
that could be exported in the form of linen tex-
tiles; the motive behind this development was a 
desire to avoid importing linen goods from 
Eastern Europe. 
In both cases, however, the measures taken 
led to crises elsewhere. There was unemploy-
ment in the British paper industry and Russian · 
linen producers had difficulty in marketing their 
wares. 
It is worth noting how the ratio of imports 
to gross national product has fallen in terms of 
value since 1913. (1) 
CIF value on importation 
(as a percentage of the gross nattonat product) 
1913 1938 I 1960 
United Kingdom 24·9 18·7 17·5 
Germany 18·1 5·9 14·8 *) 
France 10·5 10·8 
Italy 16·5 13·1 14·7 
*) West Germany 
19. Employment opportunities had diminished 
and there were fewer industrial and agricultural 
markets, even before 1914; this was traceable to 
two factors: (a) the sudden change in the pattern 
of world trade after the 1914-18 war and (b) the 
headway made in terms of mechanization and 
rationalization: 
The following table shows the share of the 
major producing countries in the industrial out-
put of the world and illustrates the changes that 
had already taken place before the 1914-18 
war: 
(as a percentage of world productton) 
u.s.A. I :;;~; I U.K. I France I Russia 
1870 23·3 13·2 31·8 10·3 1·0 
1913 35·8 15·7 14·0 6·4 2·3 
1936-38 32·3 10·7 9·2 4·5 2·0 
(1) Source: "Provokation Europa" by Heinz Kuby. ·Pub-
lished by Klepenheuer Wltsch/Cologne, Berlin, p. 270. 
20. Social developments and a fear of political 
extremism led the Western Governments of the 
thirties to be much more active in the economic 
and social fields. To achieve or maintain full 
employment at home they took an increasing 
number of protectionist measures, the rider to 
which was a trend towards self-sufficiency. 
These measures often brought rapid relief 
to the national economies. At the same time, 
they aggravated the upheavals in world trade. 
Taking the long view these measures did not 
provide the correct answer. 
21. In conclusion, it will be seen that after 
the 1914-18 war, political and social develop-
ments made Western Governments more alert to 
the economic prosperity and social well-being 
of their electorates. Although the way they 
dealt with the crisis in the thirties gave' them a 
breathing space, its ultimate effect was to make 
matters worse; for every measure was cast in a 
purely national mould and without regard for 
the repercussions it might have elsewhere in 
the world. 
CHAPTER II 
The effects of the 1939-45 war on world trade 
and how these effects were absorbed 
A - Attempts to organize world trade 
Plans made during the 1939-45 war 
22. Before the 1939-45 war ended, the Allied 
Governments were already thinking about how 
the 1929 sort of crisis was to be avoided once 
peace had been restored. A whole series of 
schemes for international organizations was 
worked out with a view to economic co-opera-
tion. Such schemes formed a useful weapon in 
the psychological warfare against the Axis 
powers. (1) Indeed, the emergence of national-
socialism was to some extent due to the major 
economic crisis of the thirties. 
The United States Government played a 
particularly important part in drawing up and 
int:I;oducing these schemes which included the 
Atlantic Charter, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Their main aim was 
to remove discrimination in world trade. It 
cannot be denied that these efforts were also 
designed to put an end to the privileged position 
of the then colonial powers. 
(1) "Beyond the Welfare State" by Gunnar Myrdal, Chap-
ter VI, Duckworth, London, 1960. 
Role of the United Nations 
23. At the first session of the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations held in 
February 1946, there was a general wish to 
continue the talks on world economic problems 
that had begun between the Allies during the 
war. 
In 1945 the American Government published 
its "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade 
and Employment" which, in this connexion, 
acted as a stimulus. These proposals were based 
on the principle that upheavals in world eco-
nomic conditions could have serious interna-
tional political implications and that the normal 
operation of world trade was therefore a factor 
for political stability. 
24. The American view was that the cause of 
international economic upheavals lay in customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions. Hence the 
main emphasis in the American Government's 
proposals was on removing such trade restric-
tions as soon as possible and on giving the 
widest possible application to the "most.: 
favoured nation" clause. 
Other countries," such as those in the British 
,commonwealth, on the other hand put the 
emphasis on employment. and were opposed to 
any hasty rescission of protection measures. 
25. The outcome of the discussions held by 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
was a decision to call a special conference on 
world economic problems. After the two pre-
liminary conferences held, respectively in Lon-
don and Geneva, the International Conference 
on Trade and Employment was held in Havana 
at the end of 1947. This produced the Havana 
Charter which provided for the creation of an 
international trade organization to which 
member countries would transfer far-reaching 
prerogatives. According to its charter, the orga-
nization was to have responsibilities in the field 
of full employment, international cartels and 
primary-commodity agreements. 
The Havana Charter fails to win acceptance 
26. Although the Havana Charter was mooted 
by the United States Government, it foundered 
principally on the opposition of the American 
Congress, which was hostile to anything that 
smacked of planned economy and reluctant to 
surrender any trade policy powers. 
It should not be forgotten that the willingness 
to co-operate that had existed between the 
Allies during the war diminished once victory 
had been won. 
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
27. At the session it held in February, 1946, 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
had drawn up a number of points of the work-
ing programme for the Committee that was to 
prepare the World Trade Conference. One of 
these points was an international agreement on 
restrictions and discrimination affecting world 
trade. 
28. The American Government invited the 
countries represented on the Preparatory Com-
mittee to negotiations on the reduction of cus-
toms duties and the elimination of other obsta-
cles to trade. The countries concerned accepted 
and the Preparatory Committee recommended, 
at its first meeting held in the autumn of 1946, 
that tariff negotiations be conducted at its next 
meeting; the Committee felt that this would 
pave the way for an outline charter on world 
trade. 
The negotiations took place in Geneva in the 
Spring of 1947 at the second meeting of the 
Preparatory Committee. As far as the United 
States were concerned, the basis for these nego-
tiations was the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
which had been prorogued until June 1948 and 
empowered the President to negotiate a 50 °/o 
reduction in the 1945 customs duties without 
consulting the Congress. 
29. As a result of these negotiations the 
United States Government concluded bilateral 
agreements with several countries. It was 
agreed that all the countries concerned would 
apply the "most-favoured nations" clause; this 
made it possible to embody all the bilateral 
agreements concluded in Geneva in an ad hoc 
agreement which was called the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On 
30 October 1947, 23 countries signed this 
Agreement and it came into force on 1 March 
1948. 
Although theoretically GATT was intended 
to serve as the basis for the "Trade" section of 
the Charter still to be established, it was already 
practically certain that this Charter would 
never get off the ground. 
30. Since then no full scale trade organization, 
of the sort envisaged when the International 
Trade Organization (I.T.O.) was created, has 
emerged. Its advocates made another attempt in 
this direction in 1954/55. Certain members of 
GATT had decided to create a permanent trade 
organization to be known as the Organization 
for Trade Co-operation (O.T.C.) This, however, 
suffered the same fate as the I.T.O. Not only 
did the United States refuse to co-operate but 
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so did many other countries. The relevant plans 
lie to-day in the archives of Geneva. (1) 
B - World trade developments 
The changing pattern of world trade 
31. As stated in Chapter I, one of the effects 
of World War I was to lead again certain 
industrial countries to encourage agriculture at 
home; other countries which had been suppliers 
of agricultural and primary products for the 
industrialized States sought to promote their 
own industrialization. It was also seen that the 
thirties' crisis induced the western countries to 
adopt protection measures tending towards 
national self-sufficiency. 
During World War II, when the supply and 
marketing machinery of world trade became 
clogged up for the second time, the trend that 
had emerged so clearly in Germany in the 
thirties, now developed in other countries. They 
began to introduce production methods that 
enabled them to economize on primary commo-
dities, to resort to substitutes and to create new 
industries. In 1946, for instance, there were 600 
man-made fibre manufacturers who, that year, 
produced a total of 1· 7 m. tons-equivalent to 
the amount of wool obtained from one thousand 
million sheep. The production of natural wool 
in 1946 was 1· 5 m. tons. 
At the same time they encouraged a higher 
domestic output of basic and agricultural pro-
ducts which had hitherto been imported from 
traditional producer countries; this was a new 
departure also. The American Government, for 
example, encouraged a large-scale domestic 
production of soya-beans for use in vegetable 
fats. 
32. This trend did not end with the war. 
Whereas in the thirties protectionism was 
almost the universal rule, the post-war trend 
among western countries was towards free trade 
as is borne out by the conclusion of GATT and 
the establishment of the OEEC, the EEC and 
EFTA. 
In section 22 of this report, it was seen that 
even before the end of World War II, the Allied 
Governments were directing their thoughts to 
how they could forestall any post-war recurrence 
of the 1929 sort of depression; the negotiations 
that later led to the Benelux Charter are one 
example of this. 
(1) Sources: Keesing•s Historical Archives, 1964, p. 195; 
Dr. F. K. Liebich, Das GATT (Schriftenreihe zum 
Handbuch fUr Europliische Wirtschaft - August Lut-
zeyer (Bonn), 1961. Dr. R. Zinser, Das GATT und die 
Meistbeglinstigung (same series and publisher) 1961. 
33. There were various reasons why countries 
were more willing to co-operate after the 
1939-45 war. Economically, the industrial poten-
tial was assuming increasing importance; it 
became necessary to think in terms of larger 
economic and political entities. In view of the 
substantial increase in productivity in the United 
States and in the USSR, Europe was afraid of 
being left behind. Similarly, tension between 
East and West predisposed western countries to 
closer economic co-operation. 
Decolonization subsequently increased this 
tendency and as political instability often 
followed in the newly independent States of 
Africa and Asia, the former colonial powers 
began to focus greater attention on Europe. This 
led to a substantial increase of trade between 
the industrialized countries while the share of 
world trade of the less-developed countries fell 
from approximately 32 °/o to. around 25 °/o (1) 
between 1950 and 1962. 
The industrialized countries' production today 
accounts for 75 Ofo of the world's total and this 
includes two thirds of all primary commodities 
i. e. including agricultural products. (2) 
Changes in British and French foreign trade 
34. Against this background, the foreign trade 
of the United Kingdom and France is worth 
analyzing because, as former colonial powers, 
their development has been so typical in relation 
to the changing pattern of world trade. (3) 
Britain's foreign trade 
35. In the course of time, the position and 
status of Britain in Europe enabled her to build 
up a vast network of overseas connexions. In the 
19th century, she was the first industrial country 
in the world to have established a division of 
work whereby the home country looked after 
industrial production while its dependencies 
overseas looked after raw materials and agricul-
tural produce. At the same time, Britain was the 
leading naval power in the world; hence there 
was no danger of her being cut off from her 
sources of supply. 
36. Consequently she neglected her agricul-
ture in the 19th century, preferring to import 
cheap foodstuffs from her overseas dependencies. 
It was the first world war that brought a change 
of government policy. As Lloyd George pointed 
out in 'his Memoirs, the German submarines very 
(1) These figures are taken from the report of the Jean-
neney Committee on French policy with regard to 
co-operation with the less-developed countries, 18 July 
1963. 
(2) Source: Mr. Hans Apel, "Europas Neue Grenzen", 
p. 180; Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne/Berlin, 1964. 
(8) See "Provokation Europa" (Chapter IV, p. 266-281). 
nearly cut Britain's supply lines. British agricul-
tural and especially cereal and sugar beet pro-
duction has increased fairly substantially, thanks 
to government support since then. 
37. It must be remembered that even before 
the first world war, Britain did not espouse 
without some misgivings the principle of com-
plete free trade officially embodied in British 
policy by the Cobden Charter of 1860. 
38. Speaking in 1872, Disraeli argued that 
when the colonies became independent a customs 
union should be established, a military agree-
ment reached and a Commonwealth Council set 
up in London. The view was that as more rapid 
means of transport became available, it would 
be possible to turn overseas territories into parts 
of the United Kingdom in the same way as Ire-
land and Scotland. The Concept of a "Greater 
Britain" embodied the opposition to the free 
trade system advocated by Cobden, who set little 
store by the possession of colonies; far more by 
the benefits likely to derive from free inter-
national competition. Economically, the idea 
underlying this imperialistic trend was to meet 
British industry's growing need for raw mate-
rials, and where possible corner new markets 
for manufactured products. 
This was a far cry from the general view 
voiced by Disraeli in 1852 when he spoke of: 
"These wretched colonies, which will be indepen-
dent in a few years, and are millstones round 
our necks." 
In the meantime countries like Germany and 
the United States were beginning to emerge as 
industrial powers. France, defeated by Germany 
in 1870, had returned to her traditional, pro-
tectionist policy. In Germany, too, protectionism 
was steadily gaining support; the American Gov-
ernment had already erected a high external 
tariff to protect its own industry. 
39. Yet the United Kingdom did not officially 
abandon free trade until 1931-32. In 1931, the 
pound was devalued; in 1932, the Ottawa Confe-
rence brought in Imperial Preference, a recipro-
cal, preferential tariff between the home country 
and the Commonwealth. 
40. It was within this preference area that 
Britain subsequently began to do the bulk .of her 
trade. Within the Commonwealth, of course, she 
sought to promote free trade but this "internal" 
market was protected by tariffs against third 
countries. At the same time, a sterling area came 
into being whose financial centre was London. 
To be successful, this system presupposed that 
(a) Britain had a credit balance with the other 
countries in the sterling area, (b) these countries 
had a credit balance with third countries, and (c) 
third countries had a credit balance with Britain. 
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41. Since the fifties this system has become 
increasingly inefficient; the sterling area coun-
tries no longer have a credit balance with third 
countries; instead they have debit balance both 
with the United Kingdom and with third coun-
tries. 
42. The United Kingdom's share in the trade 
between the sterling area and the rest of the 
world has also fallen. In the late twenties it was 
60 Ofo; by 1960 it was no more than 40%. During 
this period, the shares of Germany and Japan 
increased from 12 to 21 Ofo and that of the United 
States from 5 to 23 Ofo. The following table il-
lustrates the changing pattern of the United 
Kingdom's external trade: 
Exports to sterling area countries in million pounds 
UK EEC USA I J"apan 
1953 1208 357 410 157 
1959 1340 602 618 261 
43. The value of Britain's imports furthermore 
has been steadily decreasing in relation to the 
gross national product; between 1913 and 1960 
it fe1l from 24·9 to 17·5 Ofo. 
The volume of Britain's imports has only 
risen slightly. Between 1950 and 1960 French 
imports increased by 6 · 8 Ofo, Italian imports by 
12·1 %, Western German imports by 14·8 Ofo; 
those of the United Kingdom increased by only 
4·7 °/o. 
44. The drop in Britain's share in the export 
market is equally noteworthy. Between 1956 and 
1960 British exports of finished products fell 
from 19 to 16 Ofo while those of West Germany 
rose from 16 to 19 Ofo and of the EEC from 38 to 
44 Ofo. 
Britain's weaker position as an exporting 
country has been the more critical because this 
was the basis of the division of work in the 
Commonwealth. 
45. Between 1959 and 1963, the Common-
wealth's share of British exports fell from 36 ·1 
to 28 Ofo. As the Commonwealth has diminished 
in importance as a market for the United King-
dom so that of the EEC has increased. Between 
1959 and 1962, British exports to the European 
Com unity increased from 14 · 8 to 19 · 8 Ofo. 
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On average, trade between sterling area coun-
tries and third countries has increased as follows 
(1953 = 100): 
Imports Exports 
1951 I 1960 1951 I 1960 
Into the 116 165 97 143 United Kingdom 
--------Into sterling area 122 198 97 156 countries 
France's foreign trade 
46. With France, the position is quite the re-
verse: she is traditionally autarchic in tendency. 
Even now, France is still less dependent on world 
trade than any other western country of com-
parable size: she spends a lower percentage of 
her national income on imports than any country 
in Western Europe. 
What limits France's foreign trade still further 
is the fact that a substantial proportion of her 
imports come from tl:1e Franc area which covers 
a large part of Africa. Even today, the French 
Mercantile Marine carries 70 Ofo of the tonnage 
between France and Africa and between the 
various African countries, which gives additional 
emphasis to her autarchic tendencies. 
47. The African countries of the Franc area 
are France's main trading partners next after the 
EEC. In 1962, 34 Ofo of French imports were frpm 
the EEC, 21 Ofo from the Franc area, 10 Ofo from 
the United States and 11 Ofo from the EFTA 
countries. 
Her exports show a similar pattern: 37 °/o to 
. the EEC, 20 Ofo to the Franc area, 16 Ofo to the 
EFTA countries and only 6 Ofo to the United 
States. 
48. If the EEC and Franc area markets were 
considered as one, it could be said that in 1962 
more than 50 Ofo of French imports and almost 
60 Ofo of French exports were effected within an 
enlarged domestic market. This further reduces 
the "true" volume of France's foreign trade: the 
"true" import figure would be. no more than 
5 · 2 Ofo instead of 10 · 5 Ofo and her "true" exports 
would be 5 Ofo instead of 10 · 3 Ofo · 
49. Since the creation of the EEC, however, 
the pattern of French foreign trade has been 
changing all the time as will be observed from 
the following table: 
in thousand mt!Uon French Francs' 
Imports Exports 
1962 1963 
Franc area 7,708 7,565 
Other areas 29,427 35,536 
EEC 12,460 15,435 
West Ge~any 6,536 
50. This shows that France's trade with the 
Franc area countries has been going through a 
period of stagnation whereas her trade with 
other countries has tended to increase. Her im-
ports from the latter increased by 22 Ofo and her 
exports to them, by 11 Ofo. 
In this respect the EEC is in a special po-. 
sition. Between 1962 and 1963 French imports 
from the Member States increased by 14 Ofo and 
her exports to these countries increased by 25 Ofo. 
51. Between 1958 and 1963, the share in French 
foreign trade of the EEC and the Franc area 
underwent a considerable change: exports to the 
Franc area fell from 36 to 18 Ofo and exports to 
the Member States increased from 22 to 38 · 2 Ofo. 
52. The French five-year economic develop-
ment plan provides for an increase in foreign 
trade of about 60°/o between 1966 and 1970. The 
autarchic trend is seen to have become less pro-
nounced when this figure is compared with that 
for the period 1950-60. 
Russia's trade with developing countries 
53. As regards trade relations between the 
Soviet Union and the less-developed countries as 
a whole, it will be observed from the following 
ta!ble that the trend of her exports shows . a 
steady surplus: 
Year Imports Exports Trade balance $(1,000) 
1958 434,889 346,385 - 88,504 
1959 484,555 305,269 -179,286 
. 1960 629,444 366,409 -263,035 
1961 866,667 744,988 -121,679 
1962 809,930 901,328 - 91,398 
1963 798,041 1,100,288 + 302,247 
Source: Vnesiaia torgovlia SSSR 
Nine-tenths of Russian imports are primary 
commodities. EEC imports of primary commodi-
ties are seven times as much. 
7,760 
.,, 1962 1963 .,, 
- 2°/o 7,306 7,621 + 4 °/o 
+ 22 °/o 29,050 32,295 +110/o 
+ 25 Ofo 13,392 15,267 + 14 Ofo 
+ 190/o 6,278 6,622 + 5 °/o 
54. At the same time, it should not be forgotten 
that the exports of the less-developed countries 
to States behind the Iron Curtain suffer from the 
fact that there the main emphasis has from the 
beginning been on the creation of the means of 
production. Although in recent years the stand-
ard of living of these countries has risen, their 
increased prosperity has led principally to the 
purchase of industrial products of local manu-
facture. Hence this hardly helps the marketing 
of the primary commodities of the less-developed 
countries; the prices of coffee, cocoa and their 
by-products are so high that this considerably 
reduces their consumption. 
If Russia were to pursue a trade policy simi-
lar to that of the West with regard to coffee, 
cocoa and bananas, these products would no 
longer raise any marketing problems. In 1960, 
the total EEC imports of these products was 
thirty times as high as the volume of Russian 
imports. 
Pmmary-commodity price trends 
55. Between 1945 and 1953 commodity price 
trends were on the whole favourable from the 
point of view of the producers, for three reasons: 
(a) there was a considerable demand for primary 
commodities essential to the recovery of the 
European countries after the 1939-45 war; 
(b) the Korean War (1950-1953); 
(c) the stock-piling of substantial strategic re-
serves by the United States. 
56. After the Korean War, however, primary-
commodity prices began to sag. Delivery delays 
had affected countries cut off from their sources 
of supply during the war; there were no more of 
these; similarly American strategic reserves 
reached their peak level. At the same time, high 
prices led to an increase in primary commodity 
production. A good many of these products, such 
as rubber and cocoa, do not yield a marketable 
crop until several years have elapsed, a fact 
which seriously weakened the position of the 
producers. 
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57. In itself this development need not have 
had serious implications in view of the fact that 
the high price level obtaining in 1945 was not 
due to exceptional circumstances and could have 
been maintained. If, in fact, it did have serious 
consequences, this was because of the changes in 
the structure of world trade which demonstrates 
that the essence of the commodity price problem 
is structural. 
Deterioration of the terms of trade of the developing 
countries 
58. Apart from the fall in price of the primary 
commodities exported, the considerable increase 
in the price of imported goods has helped to 
make the position of the less-developed countries 
even more precarious. 
59. . A recent study has revealed that since 1957 
the fall in the prices paid for primary products 
by the importing industrial coqntries has saved 
them $ 7,000 m. a year. Over the same period 
their income has increased annually by $ 3,000 m. 
to 4,000 m. by virtue of the increase in the prices 
they have obtained for their exports. (1) 
In this way the industrialized countries have 
obtained an advantage of $10,000m. to ll,OOOm. 
a year to the detriment of the rest of the world. 
60. The amounts that the industrialized coun-
tries make available to the less-developed coun-
tries in the form (a) official bilateral aid, (b) 
multilateral aid through international organi-
zations, and (c) private investment, total approxi-
mately $10,000m. a year. Thus the deterioration 
of the terms of trade of the less-developed coun-
tries completely negates the effect of the aid 
dispensed to them. 
61. To set the situation in its proper prospec-
tive, however, there are two factors to bear in 
mind in evaluating these figures: 
(i) the fall in price of imports into the industrial 
States has also been due to a fall in inter-
national freight rates; 
(ii) the increase in the prices of finished pro-
ducts, especially capital goods, has been 
partly due to an improvement in quality. 
62. The fact remains that the deterioration of 
the terms of trade is a serious handicap to the 
less-developed countries. Primary commodities 
account for 90 Ofo of their exports and represent 
almost their only source of income (2) and the 
prices they have fetched have been falling for a 
decade. Thus, bearing in mind the increased 
(1) Source: "The Financial Times", 19 July 1965, p. 7; 
(2) See: United Nations, Commodity Survey 1962, table 2, 
p. 7. 
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prices of industrial products, the position of the 
less-developed countries to-day could hardly be 
described as rosy. 
Conclusions 
63. To sum up it can be said that following 
the 1939-45 war the focal point in international 
trade discussions was a concern to free trade as 
much as possible. It cannot be denied that the 
outcome was to enhance the prosperity of coun-
tries whose economies were already highly de-
veloped. The elimination of protectionism led, 
as the Americans predicted, to an expansion of 
trade and hence to an increase in employment 
opportunities. 
64. At the same time, economic trends includ-
ing the growing importance of industrial poten-
tial have revealed the need for larger political 
and economic groupings. The substantial increase 
in productivity in the USA and the USSR arous-
ed Europe's fear of being left behind economic-
ally. The tension between East and West 
furthermore increased the willingness of western 
countries to co-operate more closely both politic-
ally and economically. 
65. Subsequently the move towards co-opera-
tion was consolidated by the decolonialization 
process which often went hand in hand with po-
litical instability in the newly independent 
States. As a result, many former colonial powers 
began increasingly to focus their attention on 
Europe. 
66. Yet the less-developed countries gained 
little from these developments; their share of 
world trade fell steadily and the deterioration of 
their terms of trade became an increasingly cri-
tical problem. 
67. This imbalance in the development on 
world trade may be attributed, inter alia, to the 
failure of the Havana Charter to win acceptance. 
Indeed, only its "Trade" Section found ex-
pression in the General Agreement; the "Em-
ployment" Section which provided for instance 
for extensive international commodity agree-
ments came to nothing. 
68. The most-favoured nation clause thus pre-
vailed, and this consolidated the position of the 
industrialized countries. This system brought no 
corresponding benefit to the less-developed coun-
tries because they needed protection rather than 
free trade. Hence these countries are in no po-
sition to open up their markets and yet they are 
obliged to ask for the widest possible access to 
the markets of the developed countries. 
69. The conclusion one must draw is that a 
balanced development of world trade predicates 
special conditions for the less-developed coun-
tries. International agreements based on tradi-
tional free-trade principles and the most-fa-
voured nation clause will remain meaningless 
until their economies are more highly developed. 
CHAPTER III 
Political reactions of the developing countries 
and the position adopted by GATT 
A - Political reactions of the developing 
countries 
70. Understandably, the position of the less-
developed countries outlined above prompted 
them to political action in order to protect their 
vital interessts. In 1964, this culminated in the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Deve-
lopment (UNCTAD). 
Political background to the United Nations Confe-
rence on Trade and Development 
71. Apart from the many speeches made on 
behalf of the less-developed countries and in sup-
port of re-organizing world trade, it is worth 
noting that the USSR had for many years been 
the advocate in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations of a world trade conference. 
72. At the time, the Russian efforts brought no 
response from the West where the view was that 
Russia was far less concerned with the fate of the 
less-developed countries than with sowing dis-
cord between them and the West and with end-
ing what Russia regarded as western trade dis-
crimination against the Communist countries. 
The West considered that the resolutions tabled 
by the Soviet Union were directed against GATT 
and against the creation of .economic groupings 
like the EEC. For a long time the West, sup-
ported by the less-developed countries, succeeded 
in forestalling these resolutions with. the result 
that they failed to win majority support in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
73. In 1962, however, a Russian-inspired pro-
posal obtained a majority in the U.N. General 
Assembly and it was decided to hold a conference 
on trade and development. The majority in 
favour included the votes of the less-developed 
countries. In fact, the number of these countries 
that were members of the United Nations would 
have sufficed to carry such a decision in previous 
years. The support given to the Russian proposal 
in 1962 by a substantial majority of these coun-
tries may be read as a reaction against the grow-
ing degree of political and economic rapproche-
ment between the Western countries. In 1961, the 
United Kingdom applied for membership of the 
EEC. A year later, President Kennedy announced 
his "Great Design" which led, inter alia, to the 
passing of the Trade Expansion Act by the Ame-
rican Congress in September 1962. On the as-
sumption that the United Kingdom would join 
the EEC he proposed an Atlantic partnership. 
The United States would be able to negotiate 
substantial, two-way customs duty reductions 
with an enlarged ECC through the medium of 
GATT, all of whose members would be able to 
participate in what has come to be known as the 
Kennedy Round and take advantage of the most-
favoured-nation clause. 
7 4. Understandably these developments attract-
ed a good deal of attention among the less-
developed countries especially those in the 
Commonwealth; they feared prejudice to their 
trade relations with Western countries. 
The Conference 
75. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development decided upon by the United 
Nations in 1962 took place in 1964. If Russia's 
intention was to make a bid for recognition as 
the defender of less-developed countries' in-
terests against the bad will of the West, then 
she was probably disappointed at the way the 
Conference developed. 
One of the salient events of this Conference 
was that the less-developed countries took a 
common stand on a great many issues. In a joint 
statement they described "the unity of the 75 
countries concerned" as "the dominant feature 
of the Conference" and as being "full of momen-
tous implications". 
76. Whereas previously East had been juxta-
posed with West, it was not long before this 
juxtaposition became one between North and 
South. The developing countries appealed for 
action not only on the part of the West but also 
on the part of countries behind the Iron Curtain. 
Consequently the latter tended to side with the 
West to resist the demands of the less-developed 
countries. 
77. In view of this, the West was bound to be 
more constructive in its approach to the UN 
Trade and Development Conference. Unfortun-
ately, the EEC did not take part in the Conference 
as an integrated unit. The "Brasseur Plan", 
however, had been submitted to the GATT 
Ministerial Conference in May 1963, while on 
UNCTAD, representatives of the Six took part 
in talks on the general question of customs 
preferences, both of which events give cause for 
satisfaction. A detailed account of this is to be 
found in the interesting reports that Mr. Pedini 
drew up for the External Trade Committee on 
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the problems of the World Trade Conference 
(Docs. 6 and 83/1964-65). 
78. As a result of these developments the 
West withdrew its opposition to a new world 
trade organization. Thus UNCTAD (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
came into being alongside GATT, which many 
of the less-developed countries distrusted 
because of the preponderance there of the 
western countries. 
B - The position adopted by GATT in regard 
to the less-developed countries 
Protocol amending the General Agreement 
79. A protocol amending the GATT to intro-
duce a Part IV on trade and development with 
the less-developed countries was opened for 
signature in Geneva on 8 February 1965. 
It was to come into force as soon as it had 
been signed by two-thirds of the contracting 
parties (to wit 45 countries). Most of the Con-
tracting Parties also adopted on 8 February 1965 
a Declaration providing for the de facto imple-
mentation of the new provisions until they 
entered into force de jure. 
80. With the exception of France, all the EEC 
countries signed the protocol. France considered 
that it provided for too few practical measures 
on behalf of the less-developed countries, 
especially with regard to the organization of 
markets and the granting of preferential tariffs 
to these countries. 
81. Part IV is based on a resolution adopted 
at a ministerial meeting of the Contracting 
Parties in May 1963. This resolution stressed 
the need for a legal and institutional framework 
for the efforts of GATT to promote the exports 
of the less-developed countries. It cannot be 
denied that this result stemmed partly from 
what happened during and after the 1964 UN 
Trade and Development Conference in Geneva. 
82. Part IV comprises three new Articles. In 
the first of these (Article XXXVI), paragraph 5 
reads as follows: 
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"5. The rapid expansion of the economies of 
the less-developed contracting parties 
will be facilitated by a diversification of 
the structure of their economies and the 
avoidance of an excessive dependence on 
the export of primary products. The·re 
is, therefore, need for increased access ·in 
the largest possible measure to markets 
under favourable conditions for processed 
and manufactured products currently or 
potentially of particular export interest to 
less-developed contracting parties." (1) 
Paragraph 8 of this article reads: 
"8. The developed contracting parties do not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made 
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the 
trade of less-developed contracting par-
ties." 
83. In the second article (XXXVII, 1) the 
following obligations are enumerated: 
"1. The developed contracting parties shall 
to the fullest extent possible-that is, 
except when compelling reasons, which 
may include legal reasons, make it 
impossible-give effect to the following 
provisions: 
(a) accord high priority to the reduction 
and elimination of barriers to products 
currently or potentially of particular 
export interest to less-developed contract-
ing parties, including customs duties and 
other restrictions which differentiate 
unreasonably between such products in 
their primary and in their processed 
forms; 
(b) refrain from introducing, or increasing 
the incidence of, customs duties or non-
tariff import barriers on products cur-
rently or potentially of particular export 
interest to less-developed contracting par-
ties; and 
(c) (i) refrain from imposing new fiscal 
measures, and 
(ii) in any adjustments of fiscal policy 
accord high priority to the reduction 
and eliminiation of fiscal measures, 
which would hamper, or which 
hamper, significantly the growth of 
consumption of primary products, 
in raw or processed form, wholly 
or mainly produced in the terri-
tories of less-developed contracting 
parties, and which are applied speci-
fically to those products." 
84. The third article (XXXVIII) provides, inter 
alia, for co-operation between the Contracting 
Parties on measures to improve world primary-
commodity markets; paragraph 2a specifies: 
... "including measures designed to attain 
stable, equitable and remunerative prices for 
exports of such products." 
(1) Editor's italics. 
An assessment of the measures proposed 
85. Part IV of the General Agreement con-
tains several important provisions. Of particular 
importance is the priority accorded to reducing 
or removing barriers which differentiate 
unreasonably between primary and processed 
products exported by the less-developed con-
tracting parties. The common customs tariffs of 
course is no bar to the import of primary pro-
ducts but processed products come up against a 
degree of protection that varies according to the 
degree of processing. This difference of 
treatment, which other industrialized States 
also practise, reflects a concern to protect Com-
munity processing industries. Obviously this is 
flagrantly inconsistent with the way the less-
developed countries are urged to industrialize 
and diversify their economies. 
86. An analysis of the common customs tariff 
reveals that comparatively high duties are 
charged on some goods which the less-developed 
countries could easily produce, viz: 32 per cent 
for woollen carpets, 18 per cent for cotton 
textiles, 23 per cent for jute carpets and 23 per 
cent for coconut matting. On the other hand, 
where similar products are traded between 
industrialized countries and where their manu-
facture involves more sophisticated processing, 
the duties are not as high; for example, watches 
attract 13 per cent, cameras 18 per cent, domestic 
appliances 19 per cent and computers 11 per 
cent. (1) 
87. The intention of the Contracting Parties 
to put this right is most gratifying. In this 
respect the other provisions of Part IV are also 
very welcome. 
Problems that trade policy cannot solve 
88. It cannot be denied that GATT's present 
approach is still unduly directed at the sort of 
solutions trade policy can provide. It has already 
been seen that the low level of primary-commo-
dity prices has become a structural problem for 
the less-developed countries as a result of the 
changing pattern of world trade. The deteriora-
tion of the terms of international trade has 
made it impossible for these countries to invest 
in order to broaden the basis of their economies. 
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the new 
section (i. e. Part IV) on trade and development 
in the General Agreement will bring a solution 
to this problem through a liberalization of trade. 
These countries will never be able to compete in 
world trade and they will never be able to ob-
tain any real benefit from freer trade until their 
economic rate of growth improves considerably. 
(1) See Note 2 to paragraph 33. 
It has been seen that during the first World 
War, and especially during the second one, in-
dustrialization was promoted in those countries 
that had previously done little more than export 
primary commodities. It would be erroneous to 
suppose that this process stemmed solely from 
war considerations for it had already begun and 
could be traced back to normal economic consi-
derations; the war merely quickened the process. 
Today structural change is needed more than 
ever before. This means, for instance, that pro-
cessing industries must be established in the less-
developed countries that produce primary com-
modities. They should not, for example, continue 
to export cane sugar to be refined in the in-
dustrialized countries; they must refine it at 
home and market it domestically or in neigh-
bouring countries instead of leaving it to the in-
dustrialized countries to do the exporting for 
them. The same applies to com~odities such as 
cocoa and jute. 
The foreign trade policy of the industrialized 
countries must be so re-fashioned so as to carry 
this development through in gradual stages. 
CHAPTER IV 
Attempts to stabilize primary-commodity prices 
A - International primary-commodity 
agreements 
89. Attempts were being made even before 
the 1914-18 war to stabilize primary-commodity 
markets through international agreements. The 
efforts in this direction were further stimulated 
by the economic crisis of the thirties and con-
tinued after the 1939-45 war. 
The relevant developments were: 
(a) the creation of cartels between individual 
producers; 
(b) an increasing measure of Government inter-
vention with respect to these cartels and the 
subsequent creation of cartels at inter-
governmental level during and after the 
economic crises of the thirties; 
(c) after the 1939-45 war, the conclusion of pri-
mary-commodity agreements at inter-
governmental level, at which, for the first 
time, producing and consuming countries 
were represented on an equal footing. 
90. The distinction between producer and con-
sumer countries results from political changes 
that took place since 1945. Before that date, the 
practice had been for the industrialized coun-
tries to be both consumers and producers-the 
latter by virtue of their status as colonial powers. 
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Thus, pre-war trade arrangements were entered 
into between industrialized countries only. The 
accession to independence of former colonies en-
tailed the creation of two new categories, viz: 
the producer countries (in the main developing 
countries) and the consumer countries (mostly 
industrialized). 
Experience gained 
91. Only four international primary-commodity 
agreements, covering tin, coffee, sugar and 
wheat, (1) have been concluded since the war. 
This shows how difficult they are to achieve. The 
many attempts made to arrange similar inter-
national agreements for other products have 
failed because of major differences of opinion. 
92. The most frequent disagreement has been 
between producer and consumer countries as to 
the level at which prices should be set. Where 
neither dominates the market and where there is 
no overriding political motivation, there is no 
possibility of agreement. 
93. Although in most cases it is the producer 
countries that have taken the initiative with re-
gard to primary-commodity agreements, they do 
not always see eye to eye with each other. This 
is because there are always a certain number of 
producers who wish to take advantage of a high 
price level but who are unwilling to set a 
ceiling on their output or submit to international 
control. 
94. A certain number of international agree-
ments for agricultural products are envisaged 
as part of the Kennedy Round. A working party 
in Geneva is already engaged in drawing up an 
international agreement on cereals. 
95. Experience has shown, however, that na-
tions fight shy of giving up any part of their 
national sovereignty and this is what stands in 
the way of such an agreement. This diffidence 
stems from the following considerations: 
(i) the social component in national agricul-
tural policy; farm incomes have to be ade-
quate and an attempt made to reduce the 
disparity between the incomes of those who 
work on the land and those of comparable 
occupational groups in other sectors; 
(ii) if a country has balance-of-payments diffi-
culties it may be forced to restrict its im-
ports and increase its domestic production; 
(iii) a country may, for defence policy reasons, 
wish to keep its domestic agricultural pro-
(1) In view of the special nature of the product concerned, 
no agreement on olive oil was finalized: the producer 
countries consume 95 per cent of all the oil they 
produce. 
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duction out of any discussions (Switzerland 
for instance would not wish, because of its 
neutralist policy, to be dependent on im-
ported foodstuffs in the event of war); 
(iv) agricultural surpluses may constitute a 
form of aid to countries where it is desired 
to create a favourable political climate (as 
is the case with America's aid to Yugosla-
via and India). 
B- Stabilization funds (1) 
Background 
96. During the Second World War "support 
funds" (caisses de soutien) were introduced in 
French Equatorial Africa for cotton and cocoa. 
A lack of legal provisions regulating their finan-
cial resources impaired their efficiency. After 
the war, several attempts were made to create 
independent stabilization funds. These attempts 
came to nothing, however, because of the fierce 
opposition of producers and dealers, which in 
turn was due to t}:le steady rise in price of tropi-
cal foodstuffs at that time. 
97. When cocoa, coffee and cotton prices be-
gan to fall in the fifties in the former French 
colonies, this constituted a serious threat to their 
economies. In 1954, the French Government de-
cided to regulate primary-commodity prices by 
setting up stabilization funds, a score of which 
are still in operation within the Franc area. 
Aims 
98. The main purpose of the stabilization 
funds, while not overlooking world-market price 
trends, is to guarantee a minimum price to the 
producer. They are not intended to eliminate 
private enterprise. Furthermore they are de-
signed to improve product quality and promote 
economic development in so far as the means 
available allow. 
99. There is a separate fund for each product 
and for each area. Each is run by a tripartite 
committee comprising representatives of produ-
cers, exporters and public authorities. Its deci-
sions have the force of law, barring the veto of 
the Government representative. 
Operation 
100. The stabilization funds do not have any 
marketing monopoly; they simply have a super-
vising brief over the activities of private dealers 
in the product concerned. Each year the Govern-
ment sets a reference export price which is re-
(1) Source: EEC Commission. 
lated to the production price set. This guaranteed 
export price reflects world prices and prices 
on the French market. 
101. If the exporter obtains a market price 
lower than the reference price, the fund must 
wholly or partly compensate him for the diffe-
rence. The amount of compensation varies from 
product to product and from country to country 
but as a general rule it covers the difference be-
tween reference and export prices completely. 
For his part the exporter is legally bound to 
pay a guaranteed minimum price to the pro-
ducer. 
If the export price is higher than the refer-
ence price, then the exporter must pay part 
or all of this surplus into the fund. This becomes 
a kind of export tax which increases in propor-
tion to the difference between the two prices. 
Financial resources 
102. Most of the decrees setting up stabili-
zation funds provide that the reserves held must 
be fairly substantial. The income of the funds 
comes from the producer who contributes a cer-
tain percentage of the average value of his har-
vest. This is how the coffee and cocoa funds for 
example have been able to build up reserves. 
At present, however, it is estimated that most 
of the reserves held in these funds will be used 
up before the end of the year because of the 
fall in cocoa and coffee prices. It should be noted 
in this connexion that the Yaounde Convention 
lays down that the stabilization funds may at-
tract development fund advances (not exceeding 
50 million units of account). 
103. To sum up, it may be said that the inde-
pendent incomes of these funds derive from (a) 
contributions (in particular from the "National 
Fund" referred to below), (b) repayments (from 
exporters) and (c) dues paid by the producer in 
proportion to the export value of his produce. 
104. To enable the stabilization funds to pro-
vide adequate financial help, France set up a 
"National Fund to regulate the prices of over-
seas products" in 1955. 
The stabilization funds may place deposits in 
this National Fund, whose function, in turn, is 
to make direct loans to the various funds or to 
the countries and territories where such funds 
exist. The loans guarantee the operation of the 
funds during the most critical periods. 
Results 
105. The stabilization funds began operating 
at a time when prices were low; hence their 
resources had to be appropriated for the direct 
stabilization of these prices. 
The reserve funds are simply a first line de-
fence; when prices fluctuated seriously, they 
would not have sufficed on their own to keep 
the system in operation. If the National Fund 
(referred to in paragraph 103) had not existed, 
the funds would not have been able to prevent 
an even greater fluctuation in production and 
guaranteed export prices in response to world 
price movements. Of late, certain funds have 
tended to become export monopolies because, 
since independence, certain states have begun 
to exercise an increasingly stringent control 
over the different stages in product marketing. 
C- Marketing Boards 
Background 
106. During the Second World War, the Bri-
tish Government thought fit to assume control 
of trade with overseas territories and to set up 
government monopolies to market tropical pro-
ducts. There were two reasons why it did this: 
the United Kingdom's need for steady supplies 
of primary commodities and foodstuffs and the 
need to protect producers, unable to export, 
against price falls on the local markets. 
After the war the British Government estab-
lished a permanent system for organizing the 
agricultural markets, to wit, the Marketing 
Boards. 
Aims 
107. Like the stabilization funds, the Market-
ing Boards were intended to provide a buffer 
between producers and 'the international market 
by insuring the producer against sudden price 
fluctuations. The Boards also serve to improve 
production and promote economic growth gene-
rally. 
Organization 
108. Each Board is responsible for marketing 
the main export products in its own region. The 
local authority appoints officials to run it and 
they in turn are accountable to the local autho-
rity. 
The Acts of Parliament creating the Market-
ing Boards empowered them to take all rele-
vant decisions concerning the purchase, quality 
improvement, export and sale of products within 
their jurisdiction. 
109. Although private individuals as well as 
officials sometimes serve on these Boards, the 
latter operate mainly as governmental bodies 
with regard to all major issues such as sales 
policy and the level at which production and 
selling prices shall be set. 
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In many areas, the Boards are required to 
take the advice of a Consultative Committee on 
which the producers are also represented. 
Operation 
110. The Boards operate in a way that is very 
similar to that of the stabilization funds. If the 
Board sells a product at a price higher than the 
established purchase price (including taxes due 
and expense of sales) the profit is paid into the 
Board's reserve fund. 
If the selling price is lower than the higher 
purchase price arrived at the Board makes good 
the difference by appropriating from its reserve 
fund. 
111. The reserves accrued may serve to fi-
nance improved farming methods or develop-
ment; their main function, however, is to cover 
any deficit resulting from price stabilization 
measures. 
Financial Resources 
112. The Marketing Boards were set up after 
the war, and were able to take advantage of the 
favourable prices then ruling (in contrast to the 
stabilization funds, created at a time of un-
favourable prices). The Boards have sought to 
keep prices low and this has enabled them to 
accumulate quite substantial reserves over the 
years. These reserves are deposited in London 
in Commonwealth bonds, the income from which 
serves partly to improve the economies of the 
overseas territories. 
Results 
113. Apart from stabilizing prices, the system 
has the following advantages: 
(a) it precludes inflation in the territories at 
times when prices are high; 
(b) although stringently applied it has sometimes 
made possible the appropriation of a signifi-
cant proportion of the people's income for 
the purposes of economic development; this 
was achieved much more easily than by levy-
ing taxes. 
D - Conclusions 
114. The attempts so far made to stabilize pri-
mary-commodity prices have shown that they 
can be successful under certain circumstances. 
With regard to the less-developed countries, suc-
cess depends primarily on whether price stabili-
zation is part of an overall policy, in other words 
on whether it is directed at broadening the eco-
nomic basis of the countries concerned. 
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115. Price stabilization must therefore be 
achieved and used as a tool for helping the less-
developed countries. Its use, however, must be 
subject to certain conditions particularly con-
cerning the price level set and the quantities to 
be covered by guarantee. Similarly, stabilization 
must be directed at diversifying the economies 
of the less-developed countries. 
116. Moreover, price stabilization can only 
keep price drops within limits; it can offer no 
solution to the problem of a deterioration in the 
terms of trade. 
CHAPTER V 
Stabilizing prices and currencies 
117. Primary-commodity price stabilization also 
raises a number of monetary problems as will be 
seen below in connexion with commodity reserve 
currencies and an evaluation of the effects of 
strategic stocks on commodity prices. 
A - Proposed creation of a Commodity 
Reserve Currency 
118. In the thirties, Professor J. Goudriaan, a 
Dutch economist, described how the purchasing 
power of primary-commodity producing coun-
tries could be increased througli. an international 
commodity reserve currency. (1) The World 
Trade Conference paid special attention to this 
problem. A Memorandum was submitted on the 
creation of a Commodity Reserve Currency. (2) 
Professor Goudriaan has recently advocated the 
adoption of this system once again. In this 
connexion, he has analyzed the present inter-
national monetary system and expressed the 
view that the main threat to the expansion of 
world trade was not so much a shortage of inter-
:national liquidities as a fall in price of the 
primary commodities exported by the less-
developed countries which bore witness to 
their severely reduced purchasing power. What 
he advocated to stabilize primary-commodity 
prices was the creation of an International Com-
modity Corporation. This would be financially 
independent and come solely and directly under 
the International Monetary Fund. 
119. The point he emphasized was the 
increasingly disquieting similarity between 
monetary trends in recent years and those that 
foreshadowed the major crisis of the thirties. 
(I) Regarding Professor Goudriaan's theory, see "Econo-
misch-Statistische Berichten", 21. 7. 1965, 28. 7. 1965, 
4. 8. 1965, 11. 8. 1965. 
(2) The memorandum was drawn up for the UN Confe-
rence on Trade and Development by A.G. Hart, N. 
Kaldor and :1. Tinbergen. 
Indeed, the ratio between fiduciary issues and 
gold stocks has been growing increasingly 
unfavourable. Attention today focuses on 
whether international liquidities are sufficient 
but no attention is paid to the real problem of 
what these international liquidities are really 
worth. One reason for concern is that the US 
contribution to the IMF's gold reserves is much 
smaller than it should be. This has produced 
undue tension in the field of international credit. 
International circulation of fiduciary issues is 
quite different from fiduciary circulation at the 
national level. In the latter case, the State 
supports the central bank and makes bank notes 
legal tender; there is no similar authority at the 
international level. 
Commodities and currency stability 
120. In the opinion of Professor Goudriaan, a 
sound international monetary system should pro-
vide the wherewithal for guaranteeing currency 
stability-if it is to play its threefold part in 
respect of payments, savings and as a standard of 
value, it must comprise a third component in 
addition to gold and paper currency. 
According to that theory, no monetary system 
can guarantee currency stability efficiently while 
the possibility of a collapse in primary-commo-
dity prices remains. This possibility will 
not be ruled out until direct and systematic ar-
bitration between currencies and commodities is 
introduced by intervention on a series of com-
modity markets. 
121. Mr. Goudriaan has drawn attention to the 
fact that the efforts made by the United King-
dom and the United States to restore their ba-
lances of payments has led to a British refusal 
to lend money to India and to Ghana and to an 
increase, in the United States, in the number of 
people demanding that American aid for the less-
developed countries be reduced. Mr. Goudriaan 
felt that credit restrictions applied throughout 
the world have a special impact on wholesale 
trade in that they inevitably lead to a reduction 
in stocks held. 
122. Mr. Goudriaan estimates the annual in-
come from 12 or 14 tropical or sub-tropical pro-
ducts exported by the less-developed countries 
at roughly $ 9,000 m. a year; the corresponding 
figure for world exports as a whole is not even 
as high as $12,000 m. It would therefore be fi-
nancially possible to valorize a proportion of 
these exports. 
123. A collective valorization of primary com-
modities would not only cure commodity price 
instability, but would provide an appropriate 
way of curing the instability of international 
liquidities represented by paper currencies; it 
would thus make it possible to stabilize the gold 
standard. 
124. In this connexion, Mr. Goudriaan draws 
attention to the fact that most of the industria-
lized countries pursue an agricultural policy 
which secures them against any collapse of agri-
cultural product prices. The United States have 
a Commodities Credit Corporation, the EEC, the 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and 
the United Kingdom has its Marketing Boards. 
125. For a long time, periodic price collapses 
held back the development of agricultural pro-
ductivity. Indeed, it was not until prices were 
stabilized that the industrialized countries were 
able to rationalize their agriculture. At the same 
time, increased prosperity on the' farms had a 
favourable effect on the whole economy. 
B - The significance of strategic stocks 
126. The United States Government recently 
decided to sell 200,000 tons of copper and 1· 4 
million tons of aluminium from its strategic 
stocks. (1) It did not do this because it had a sur-
plus of reserve stocks but, presumably, in order 
to bring pressure to bear on prices. These stocks 
were originally intended to provide a ready 
supply of essential raw materials in the event of 
war. Today these stocks also serve the purposes 
of economic strategy. 
127. In fact the United States has attained to 
a highly influential position with respect to set-
ting prices for products that are of particular im-
portance to the economies of the less-developed 
countries. 
128. Towards the middle of 1965, the cash 
value of American strategic stocks was $ 8,200 m., 
that is $4,300 m. more than the amount original-
ly expected. (In this connexion, it may be worth 
mentioning that the value of American strategic 
stocks is well over half the gold reserves of the 
United States.) It is because these stocks are well 
in excess of strategic needs-as originally esti-
mated-that they can be used to serve specific 
economic ends on national and international 
markets with regard to commodity prices. 
129. The dollar is a key currency, and this has 
enabled the USA to pursue a policy which, with-
out raising the price of gold, has produced infla-
tion in some countries. In recent years, this has 
led to a considerable drop in gold reserves, and 
attempts are now being made to find new ways 
in which a deliberately inflationist policy may 
be prevented from leading to an increase in the 
price of gold, i.e. to devaluation. The fact re-
mains that because of its vast gold reserves, the 
American Government has been able to control 
the value of gold in relation to that of other 
(1) Source: "Nieuwe Rotterdame Courant", 4 December 
1965, p. 13. 
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goods. This policy has led to a fall in the value 
of gold (in terms of goods) as great as the fall in 
the value of the dollar expressed in terms of 
goods (i.e. in the purchasing power of the dollar). 
This is the rider to a fixed price for gold. 
130. What the American Government can do 
by virtue of its vast gold reserves, it can also do 
to some extent by virtue of its strategic stocks 
which, as we have seen, are considerable. It will 
be remembered that these are commodities of 
importance to the prosperity of less-developed 
countries. 
131. Strategic stocks can also play a consider-
able part from another point of view. When we 
speak of the position of the dollar we usually 
refer principally to the size of US gold reserves. 
Bearing in mind the high value of US strategic 
stocks, however, we could consider these as a 
second reserve of gold converted into goods. 
132. Under certain conditions these stocks can 
be used to consolidate the position of the dollar 
in so far as they exceed the level originally in-
tended. 
C- Comment 
133. Professor Goudriaan's theory on stabi-
lizing primary-commodity prices contains a num-
ber of interesting points. It shows, in particular, 
that price stabilization could not only be pro-
fitable to the less-developed countries in the 
short term but also have a positive effect on the 
world's economy. 
It must, however, be pointed out that: 
(a) the primary-commodity price problem is not 
only a short-term economic problem but also 
and above all a structural one (see para-
graphs 31 and 32); 
(b) the proportion of primary commodities in 
international trade (including those exported 
by the industrialized countries) is falling 
steadily in relation to the proportion of pro-
cessed products; 
(c) price stabilization may lead to an unwel-
come increase in production, as well as keep-
ing alive unprofitable concerns and holding 
back the expansion of sound businesses; 
hence production restrictions are also desir-
able; 
(d) price increases are not the only way of in-
creasing the producers' income. They may 
achieve a better return by selling more at 
lower prices, provided they can cut produc-
tion costs and provided that a market ana-
lysis shows that a price cut will increase 
demand; 
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(e) technological progress has created the possi-
bility of using substitute products. If the 
price of a g:ven commodity is set at an arti-
ficial level, there is the danger that the con-
sumer may opt for a substitute product. 
CHAPTER VI 
Assistance available to the less-developed 
countries 
134. In previous chapters, the difficulties aris-
ing in a changing world in connexion with inter-
national trade and as regards the economic po-
sition of the less-developed countries have been 
described. In some cases, possible remedies have 
been indicated. The aim of this chapter is to sum 
up these conclusions and define a new approach 
to the problem of strengthening the economies of 
the less-developed countries. 
Stabilizing primary-commodity prices 
135. In Chapter IV of this working paper, the 
attempts so far made to stabilize primary-com-
modity prices were described. On examination, it 
emerges that the chances of success are greater 
when price stabilization is one of the components 
of an overall policy and less where it hinges on 
miscellaneous piecemeal measures. Indeed, where 
success has been achieved this has to a large 
extent been due to an agreement by an in-
dustrialized country or a group of such countries 
to make price stabilization an integral part of 
their national economic policies. It has been con-
tingent on the willingness of such countries to 
take-on behalf of the less-developed countries-
similar measures to those taken on behalf of na-
tional producers. The willingness to regard over-
seas States not simply as "foreign" countries, 
even in the economic sense, has been, to a large 
extent, due to long-standing political and cul-
tural ties or specific interests. Examples of this 
are the stabilization funds and the Marketing 
Boards. Also worth noting in this connexion is 
the guarantee given by the United States to the 
Phillipines and to some South American coun-
tries to purchase given quantities of sugar (i.e. 
quantities not purchased from domestic pro-
ducers). 
Need to organize world markets 
136. There is, however, the danger that a po-
licy which, because of special relations, gives a 
preferential position on the domestic market to 
a series of overseas producers, may lead to a 
similar situation on the world market to that 
resulting from measures taken by the developed 
countries on behalf of national producers in the 
thirties. It is necessary to bear in mind-however 
paradoxical this may appear-that where price 
levels are favourable to national producers, this 
may lead to unfavourable prices on the world 
market which may increasingly tend to become 
one where supply exceeds demand. 
137. International market organizations are 
therefore necessary for a further reason, in that 
it is increasingly difficult for a country to carry 
the cost of price stabilization on behalf of pro-
ducers in overseas territories. 
138. The United 'Kingdom, for example, with 
its systerri of Marketing Boards, has been able to 
stabilize prices in the interests of overseas pro-
ducers; this was possible, however, because of 
special circumstances. What made the success 
of the Marketing Boards was that they were able 
to take advantage of a period in which prices 
were favourable and thus accumulate reserves; 
this success was also due to the fact that London 
is a great trading and financial centre. When we 
speak of the Sterling area, we are referring to 
a whole complex of inter-dependent political, 
economic and monetary factors. The success of 
the Marketing Board system was also due to the 
fact that it was able to operate within the Com-
monwealth framework. 
139. Yet changes in the international political 
situation have led to changes in the economic and 
political position of the United Kingdom and in 
relations between Commonwealth countries. A 
weaker pound and the change of emphasis in the 
traditional pattern of trade were at once the 
cause and the effect of this change in the United 
Kingdom's position. One result is that it will be 
increasingly difficult for that country to guaran-
tee real price stabilization to overseas producers; 
it will become increasingly difficult for the 
United Kingdom to integrate the necessary meas-
ures within her national policy because of this 
change in her economic and political position. (1) 
140. But the United Kingdom is not the only 
country to be faced with such difficulties. Even 
a country as economically strong as the United 
States would no longer alone be able to bear the 
costs involved in a real primary-commodity price 
stabilization on behalf of a considerable number 
of overseas producers. 
141. The inescapable conclusion is that if this 
problem is to be solved, the policy structure of 
the countries concerned will have to be inter-
nationalized. In practice this will mean setting 
up market organizations on an international 
scale, to deal first and foremost with tropical 
foodstuffs. It should not be forgotten that the 
main aim of price stabilization should be to in-
crease the purchasing power of the less-deve-
loped countries. These countries are predomi-
(1) See paragraphs 25-36. 
nantly agricultural and most of the people who 
live there work on the land; hence this problem 
must attract a high priority. 
142. Industry and mining are still largely neg-
lected in the less-developed countries. These sec-
tors employ only a small percentage of the po-
pulation and the enterprises concerned are often 
under western management. 
143. The classification of primary production 
drawn up by UNCTAD is as follows: 
(a) tropical products for which there are no 
immediate substitutes; 
(b) primary products which can be made syn-
thetically or replaced by other products; 
(c) primary products that are produced both in 
the less-developed and the developed coun-
tries. 
144. The creation of international market or-
ganizations of the sort we have described should 
be followed by the creation of an International 
Credit" Commodity Corporation whose financing 
system would ensure a redistribution of income. 
The activities of that corporation would be co-
ordinated with those of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Compensatory financial aid 
145. Apart from price stabilization which is 
intended primarily to increase the short-term 
purchasing power of the less-developed countries, 
other measures are also called for. Although the 
stabilization of primary-commodity prices is in 
itself desirable, it can only represent part of the 
answer for the following reasons: 
(a) it will only affect a small number of major 
products and will thus give a unilateral ad-
vantage to the countries producing them; 
this becomes even more pronounced when 
price setting is part of the aid policy pursued 
on behalf of the countries concerned; 
(b) it keeps primary-commodity price falls with-
in certain limits but does not solve the pro-
blem of the deterioration of the terms of 
trade. (1) 
146. Your Committee endorses the view that 
these drawbacks could be overcome if the in-
dustrialized States compensated the less-deve-
loped countries financially for the loss sustained 
by them as a result of the deterioration of their 
terms of trade; this financial compensation 
should be provided in the form of extra assis-
tance. 
(1) See paragraph 105. 
21 
147. It is worth remembering in this connexion 
that UNCTAD adopted a proposal, tabled by 
Sweden and the United Kingdom and supported 
both by the less-developed nations and by the 
industrialized State-trading countries, to the ef-
fect that exceptional financial aid should be ex-
tended to the less-developed countries whose 
export incomes fell below reasonable expec-
tations. In other words, when the development 
programme of a country, geared to a specific 
level of export income, did not achieve its objec-
tive, then that country might, after an expert 
examination of the relevant facts, apply for spe-
cial financial assistance. 
Apart from export prices, which must be spe-
cifically recognized, import prices would also be 
considered in this connexion. In order to be able 
to submit concrete proposals, UNCTAD asked 
the World Bank to look into the possibilities of 
putting this plan into effect; in this connexion, 
it was proposed to set up a special fund that 
would be administered by the IDA (International 
Development Association). 
148. A positive approach to the primary-com-
modity problem-e. g. world commodity agree-
ments-must be coupled with the industrial di-
versification of the less-developed countries. Di-
versification (which involves the opportunity for 
developing countries to create new industries or 
to redevelop existing ones) would have an effect 
on the trade policies and domestic markets of the 
industrialized countries. · 
To give one example: the jute bag industries 
in the less-developed countries could be ex-
panded through the gradual removal by the in-
dustrialized countries of their protection meas-
ures (quotas and high import duties); in view 
of the necessary reconversion of capital and 
labour in the developed countries, the measures 
would have to be spread out over a certain time. 
The existence of the EEC and the fact that a uni-
fied trade policy-for which provision is made in 
the Treaty of Rome-will have to be introduced 
at the end of the transition period, call for special 
attention to be paid to this problem. Free trade 
in goods which is scheduled to be finalized be-
tween the Member States by the end of the 
transitional period, also calls for standardization. 
To return to the example of jute: how can a libe-
ralization policy for jute bag imports, as applied 
in certain Member States, be reconciled with the 
import quota regulations in force in other Mem-
ber States? 
Results achieved so far 
149. It should also be remembered that two 
detailed proposals for the introduction of a 
system of compensatory financing were sub-
mitted some time ago. The first was made in 1961 
by a UN group of experts, while the second was 
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made in 1962 by the Organization of American 
States (OAS). 
Both proposals advocated the creation of a 
fund which would make financial assistance 
available to the countries concerned almost auto-
matically whenever they sustained a fall in their 
export income. 
150. As a result of these proposals, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund was empowered in 1963 
to extend to the Member States a special draw-
ing right amounting to 25 °/o of their quota when 
their export income fell. The country concerned 
had to be ready in such an event to co-operate 
with the IMF with a view to restoring its ba-
lance of payments. The IMF, moreover, had the 
option in such cases to increase the drawing right 
of the primary-commodity producing countries. 
151. Although these provisions are in them-
selves a step forward, it does not mean that the 
long-term problems have thereby been solved. 
Indeed, it would mean an increase in the in-
debtedness of the unsuspecting less-developed 
countries. 
152. It does, however, call for satisfaction that 
this solution should be technically and politically 
possible for the IMF. The fact that objective cri-
teria have been established for such financial aid 
can indeed be regarded as a major success. In 
practice it is hard to lay down appropriate rules 
and establish methods whereby the application 
of such rules can be controlled. Once this pro-
blem is solved however, a conversion of loans 
into non-refundable loans, will simply be a 
matter for a political decision. If the borrowing 
country were obliged to repay the loan only if 
its exports increased over a period of from three 
to five years, this would be one solution. 
153. The granting of such assistance should 
above all be geared to a deterioration in the 
terms of trade. By placing too much emphasis on 
the fall in export receipts, the snags already re-
ferred to would be liable to recur. 
154. The compensatory payments should be 
made available to the public authorities and be 
earmarked, first and foremost, for the economic 
diversification of the less-developed countries. 
The apportionment system used for calculating 
contributions to the InternationalMonetaryFund 
might possibly be used in financing this com-
pensation; it might be adjusted to allow for the 
fact that the deterioration of the terms of trade 
of the less-developed countries worked to the 
advantage of other countries. 
155. It is also felt that to guarantee the con-
tinuity of development aid, the contributing 
countries ought also to be able to obtain short-
term credit under an international arrange-
ment. (1) Such contributing countries would then 
not be in a position of having suddenly to sus-
pend their aid when confronted with balance of 
payments difficulties. 
156. To be effective, development aid must 
flow steadily and continually and this will only 
be possible if it is instituted and applied as a 
joint undertaking. 
Regional co-operation 
157. Today the West European countries have, 
thanks originally to the Marshall Plan, reached 
the stage of economic and financial co-operation 
at the regional level. The OECD and the Euro-
pean Payments Union made a significant con-
tribution to the recovery and development of 
Western Europe. Such regional co-operation 
would also prove valuable in the less-developed 
countries. If there were regional payments 
unions and financing bodies this would quicken 
the pace of economic growth. When industries 
are created or enlarged in the less-developed 
countries to produce goods for export, this should 
be done with an eye not only to the markets of 
the developed countries, but also to those of 
neighbouring States. 
158. It should be recalled that the Marshall 
Plan itself linked financial aid with freer trade 
between the countries of Western Europe. In the 
developing countries, too, close economic co-
operation would reduce the risks of structural 
distortions and unsound investments. 
159. Regional co-operation must therefore go 
a stage further than that of regional payments 
unions and financing bodies. It should also em-
brace economic co-operation, especially in the 
form of customs unions as defined in Article 
XXIV of the GATT. If this were not possible, 
regional tariff preference and the reciprocal li-
beralization of trade could help to promote the 
development of these countries. 
Other ways of accelerating development 
160. In seeking ways of helping the less-deve-
loped countries, it is worth considering to what 
extent the investments of industrialized coun-
tries could be transferred to the less-developed 
countries, especially where the labour markets in 
the former are subject to undue tension. At pre-
sent, several industrialized countries attract a 
great many foreign workers (from countries eco-
nomically less-developed) in order to keep up the 
pace of their economic expansion. Would it not 
be more logical to transfer these investments, 
(1) See: "Dialogue des Continents", Chapter IV, (Plan, 
Paris 1963) by Pierre Uri in co-operation with the 
Atlantic Institute. 
especially the "comprehensive" investments, to 
the countries whence these workers come? This 
would promote the economic development of 
these countries and remove the disadvantages 
that are inherent in any large-scale immigration 
(housing and integration difficulties). 
161. Re-exports of processed products also 
need to be borne in mind. Israel, for example, 
exports finished products to the EEC that are 
made from primary commodities imported from 
the Community. The EEC's customs duties are 
worked out on the total value of the finished 
product and hence, too, on the value of the pri-
mary commodity originally exported by the 
Member States. In other words, these duties are 
being levied not only on the primary commodity 
(originating in a Member State) used in manu-
facture and processing. (1) Fundamentally this 
problem also arises for other less-developed 
countries that want to industrialize. 
CHAPTER VII 
The position adopted by the European Economic 
Community 
162. The EEC is one of the biggest importers 
in the world and could therefore exercice a signi-
ficant influence on world trade if it were to 
succeed in developing a common trade policy. 
It has been seen in this report that a common 
policy is a necessity. It will only be possible to 
solve the problem of the less-developed coun-
tries if action is taken on a really large scale in 
pursuit of clearly defined objectives. 
163. The first instance of such a united atti-
tude should be for all the countries in the EEC 
to sign the Part IV on Trade and Development 
introduced in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Subsequently, the EEC should give 
effect to its provisions by giving the less-deve-
loped countries access to the EEC markets for 
their finished products and so enable them to 
diversify their economies. 
164. It was seen in the previous Chapter that 
GATT has been unduly preoccupied with the 
solutions that trade policy has to offer. Such 
measures as are taken should be coupled with 
moves to help the countries concerned to do 
what they can to promote their own develop-
ment. 
165. In Chapter VI of this working paper, the 
need to set up international market organizations 
was stressed. In this connexion, the EEC can play 
(1) see Mr. Mora's report on relations between the Euro-
pean Community and the State of Israel (Doc. No. 8, 
1965-66, paragraph 38). 
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an important part. At the Kennedy Round it had 
already submitted important proposals with a 
view to a world agreement on cereals. These pro-
posals will provide a useful basis for world 
agreements on other products. A new approach 
to the problems of world trade is beginning to 
emerge. 
166. In Chapter VI, compensatory financing 
was also advocated. This should be made through 
the International Monetary Fund. Given the po-
sition of the EEC countries on the "Group of 
Ten" (which includes all Member States except 
Luxembourg), the attitude taken by the Com-
munity with regard to this question could act 
as a powerful stimulus. 
The United Kingdom and Sweden further-
more (who are also members of the "Group of 
Ten") submitted and won acceptance for a pro-
posal to this effect at the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development. An appeal 
now has to be made to other countries, i. e. to the 
United States, Canada and Japan, to give their 
support to this compensatory financing scheme. 
167. With regard to the preferences accorded 
to States associated with the EEC, the latter is 
bound by the Yaounde Convention. One impor-
tant development is to be noted in this con-
nexion. All the less-developed countries which 
took part in the UNCTAD, including those asso-
ciated with the EEC, were agreed in regarding 
the present special preferences as temporary and 
to be phased out as effective measures are taken 
at the international level to confer equivalent 
benefits of the countries concerned. This attitude 
was endorsed in the official records of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
168. In conclusion, it should be emphasized 
that the European Communities already make 
a valuable contribution to political and economic 
stability throughout the world. This contribution 
could be even greater if they continued to deve-
lop according to the letter and the spirit of the 
Rome and Paris Treaties. This is the only way 
to achieve a common world policy which is a 
prerequisite of such development. The accession 
of the United Kingdom and of other European 
countries would undoubtedly contribute further 
to the action possibilities of the European Com-
munities in that field. 
Proposal for a Resolution 
relating to the problem of stabilizing world primary-commodity markets in the 
light of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
The European Parliament, 
- having examined the Report of its External 
Trade Committee and the Opinions submitted 
by the Agricultural Committee and the Com-
mittee for Co-operation with Developing 
Countries (Doc. 76); 
- directing attention to the views already ex-
pressed by it in its Resolutions of 19 October 
1964 and 23 November 1965; (1) 
1. notes that trends in world trade continue 
to work to the disadvantage of the developing 
countries because of the constant worsening of 
their terms of trade and their shrinking share 
of total world trade; 
2. holds that so long as the economies of the 
developing countries do not lend themselves to 
measures based on classical liberalization prin-
ciples and on the most-favoured nation clause, 
the industrialized countries must accord them 
a preferential position on a non-reciprocal basis; 
(1) Resolution on the results of the United Nations Con-
ferenc.e on Trade and Development (J. 0. No. 117/1964) 
and Resolution on the expansion of trade between the 
EEC and the Associated African and Malagasy States 
J.O. No. 209/1965). 
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3. considers that the newly-added Part IV of 
GATT represents an important step in the right 
direction; 
4. considers that the first essential is to adapt 
the pattern of production in these countries to 
the new international economic and political 
situation, for which purpose , their economies 
must be diversified and regionally readjusted; 
5. believes it to be the duty of the developing 
countries to gear their industrial and agricul-
tural policies to this situation, and champions 
the principle of compensatory financing for de-
veloping countries should the modernization of 
their economies be threatened by a widening 
disparity between the prices of primary com-
modities and those of industrial products; 
6. stresses, however, that such diversification 
and regional readjustment cannot be achieved 
over a short period, and that steps must there-
fore be taken forthwith to stabilize world pri-
mary-commodity markets, particularly by set-
ting up internqtional market organizations for 
tropical agricultural products; 
7. draws attention to the Community's spe-
cial responsibility in this sphere as the world's 
largest importer of tropical products and signa-
tory to the Yaounde Convention; 
8. regards it as higly desirable that the EEC 
should lay down a common policy with respect 
to the new international institutions for trade 
and development; 
9. stresses that the development of the Euro-
pean Community along Community lines is es-
sential if it is to make an increasing contri-
bution to international political and economic 
stability, as only in this way will it be possible 
to set up an effective world-wide common po-
licy; 
10. considers that the accession of the Unit-
ed Kingdom and of other European countries 
would substantially increase the European Com-
munity's contribution, and that the latter should 
take the necessary political action, in close colla-
boration with the United States, with a view to 
finding a solution consonant with changed world 
conditions; 
11. instructs the Parliamentary Committees 
concerned to continue to keep track of these 
problems; 
12. invites its President to transmit this pro-
posal for a Resolution and the relevant report 
to the EEC Commission and the Council. 
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ANNEX I 
Opinion 
of the Agricultural Committee 
Drafter: Mr. H. A. Lucker 
In a letter dated 19 June 1964 the Agricultural Committee was instructed to 
prepare an Opinion on behalf of the External Trade Committee on the report to 
be submitted by that Committee on the problem of stabilizing world primary-
commodity markets in the light of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
Mr. Lucker was appointed Drafter of the Opinion by the Agricultural Com-
mittee. 
At its meeting of 17 March 1966'the Committee examined the Working Docu-
ment drawn up by Mr. Kapteyn for the Working Party of the External Trade 
Committee, Agricultural Committee and Committee for Co-operation with De-
veloping Countries. 
At a meeting held on 25 March 1966 the Agricultural Committee approved 
the Opinion reproduced in the following pages. 
The following were present: Mr. Boscary-Monsservin, Chairman; Mr. Saba-
tini, Vice-Chairman; Mr. Vredeling, Vice-Chairman; Mr. Lucker, Drafter; Messrs. 
Baas, Bading, Battaglia (deputizing for Mr. Rossi), Berthoin, Blondelle, Breyne, 
Carboni, Charpentier, Droscher (deputizing for Mrs. Strobel), De Gryse (depu-
tizing for Mr. Klinker), Kriedemann, Lardinois, Miss Lulling (deputizing for Mr. 
Loustau), and Messrs. Marenghi, Mauk, Moro, Muller and Richarts. 
Draft Opinion 
1. The Agricultural Committee has noted with 
interest the Working Document relating to the 
problem of stabilizing world primary-commodity 
markets. (1) 
It approves the contents of this document and 
notes that the views underlying it are in agree-
ment with those expressed in the Opinions pre-
viously prepared by the Agricultural Committee 
on the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
2. It is pointed out in the Working Document 
that the UNCTAD Committee on primary com-
modities has broken down these products as 
follows: 
(a) tropical products for which substitutes of a 
kindred nature do not exist; 
(b) primary commodities for which synthetic or 
other substitutes are available; 
(c) primary commodities produced both in the 
developing and in the developed countries. 
(1) See Working Document prepared by Mr. Kapteyn (PE 
14.973) on the problem of stabilizing world primary-
commodity markets in the light of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
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3. If agricultural products are treated as a 
class on their own, they can in turn be subdi-
vided as follows: 
(a) Agricultural products produced exclusively 
in tropical areas 
These include coffee, tea and cocoa. N ego-
tiations on world-wide agreements have so 
far been conducted at ad hoc conferences. 
(b) Agricultural products from the temperate 
zones 
These include cereals, milk products and 
meat. Nearly all major producer areas are in 
the developed countries. Preliminary nego-
tiations on world-wide agreements for these 
products are being conducted within GATT. 
(c) Agricultural products from tropical areas 
equivalent to, and competing with, products 
from the temporate zones 
These include rice, sugar, vegetable fats and 
tobacco. This group of products will present 
the greatest obstacles to an international so-
lution. In this respect the Community is 
bound by the Yaounde Convention, under 
Article 11 of which the Community must take 
into account the interests of the Associated 
States in determining its common agricul-
tural policy. 
As to the way this problem should be dealt 
with, the Agricultural Committee would make 
the following comments: 
4. As regards the products falling under 3 (a), 
it does not regard it as its task to deal with the 
problems involved, and does not therefore pro-
pose to express its views on the subject. 
5. As regards the products falling under 3 (b), 
as mentioned above, negotiations on international 
agreements are being conducted in GATT. These 
are either already in progress (for example, in 
the case of cereals) or due to be started up some 
time this year. 
By a Decision of the Bureau of the European 
Parliament of 11 March 1966 the Agricultural 
Committee is responsible for international agree-
ments on these products. As the Committee in-
tends to submit reports on this subject to the 
European Parliament in the course of the year, 
it sees no point in going further into this question 
in the following pages. 
6. As regards the products falling under 3 (c), 
the Agricultural Committee considers that the 
EEC has already taken up a fundamental po-
sition on the subject. The obligation to take into 
account the interests of the Associated States and 
of the Overseas countries and territories was al-
ready partially discharged, following the entry 
into force of the Yaounde Convention, through 
Regulation No. 121/64 concerning the system to 
be applied to rice and broken rice. 
7. The Agricultural Committee emphasizes 
the fundamental need to provide a stimulus to 
the processing industry in the producer coun-
tries. It has therefore welcomed the fact that the 
EEC Commission has followed the same line in 
its proposal concerning oil-seeds. 
8. As already pointed out in the European 
Parliament's Resolution on rice and broken rice 
from the Associated African States, this problem 
must finally be settled within the context of a 
world-wide agreement, particularly as the EEC 
Regulation does nothing to solve the problem of 
the price level for sales in the EEC. (1) 
9. According to the Bureau's decision referred 
to in paragraph 4 above, the Agricultural Com-
mittee is also responsible for dealing with pro-
blems arising from a world-wide agreement on 
sugar and vegetable fats. 
(I) See Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes, 
No. 147 of 29 September 1964, Regulation No. 121/64. 
10. As regards the common agricultural policy 
it appears logical to the Agricultural Committee 
that in due course it should take over the main 
responsibility for dealing with the other products 
covered by 3 (c). It does not therefore intend to 
go deeply into these problems in these pages. 
11. A comparison between the breakdown of 
agricultural products with UNCTAD's classifi-
cation of primary commodities shows that a 
number of agricultural products from the tempo-
rate zone (cereals, milk products, meat) do not 
fall under the latter. As mentioned in para-
graph 5 above, the Agricultural Committee does 
not intend to deal in detail with this class of 
agricultural products. Nevertheless it feels it is 
advisable to offer the External Trade Committee, 
as the body mainly concerned, the following sug-
gestions for solving the problem of stabilizing 
world primary-commodity prices. 
12. In its Opinion the Agricultural Committee 
would like to confine itself to requesting the Ex- ? 
ternal Trade Committee to include the following 
items in the Resolution on the problem of stabi-
lizing world primary-commodity prices: 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the fact that economic prog-
ress in a large number of developing coun-
tries depends, at least for the foreseeable 
future, on their exports of agricultural pro-
ducts, and that these exports are clearly at a 
disadvantage, both as to volume in compa-
rison with world standards, and as to terms 
of trade; 
- in view of the fact that these countries are 
therefore caught up in a vicious circle since 
their position can only be improved by 
broadening the basis of their economy, a re-
medy which their lack of funds, due to inade-
quate revenue from agricultural exports, ren-
ders impracticable; 
considers that stabilization of international 
agricultural markets on the basis of world-wide 
agreements can make a valuable contribution 
towards improving the position of the developing 
countries; 
considers that world agreements can only be 
effective in the presence of facilities for balanc-
ing supply and demand and of common responsi-
bility in the financial sector; 
attaches special importance to a measure of 
compensatory financing to offset a deterioration 
in export trade relations; · 
realizes that it will be in the interests of these 
countries if stabilization of world agricultural 
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markets covers first and foremost tropical pro-
ducts and those produced both in the tropics and 
in the temperate zone (e. g. sugar and oil-seeds); 
points out however that world agreements on 
agricultural products from the temperate zone 
are of importance for the developing countries 
for the following reasons: 
(a) deliveries of foodstuffs to the developing 
countries at present depend unduly on the 
chance existence of surpluses, which are made 
available under special programmes. World 
agreements could exclude this element of 
chance since they provide a means of bring-
ing production of agricultural products into 
line with the actual needs of the developing 
countries; 
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(b) the fact that such agreements provide for 
joint responsibility in the financial sector 
will make it possible to introduce a storage 
system so as to ensure regular supplies both 
from the commercial and the foodstuffs point 
of view; 
(c) regular and more plentiful supplies are above 
all necessary because economic development 
in these countries, and the parallel advance 
of urbanization, will long continue to make 
heavy demands on agriculture in these coun-
tries; 
believes that the Community will prove of 
material help, through its common agricultural 
policy and its market organizations, in improving 
the economic situation throughout the world. 
ANNEX II 
Opinion 
of the Committee for Co-operation with Developing Countries 
Drafter: Mr. A. Armengaud 
On 18 June 1964 the European Parliament decided to invite the Committee 
for Co-operation with Developing Countries to submit an Opinion on the stabili-
zation of world primary-commodity markets in the light of the findings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of which the External 
Trade Committee, as the body mainly concerned, had been duly apprised. 
In the course of 1965 a Sub-Committee composed of five members studied 
this problem jointly with Sub-Committees appointed by the External Trade 
Committee and the Agricultural Committee. 
These Sub-Committees drew up a Working Document which on 2 March 1966 
was passed on to the three Committees concerned. 
The Committee for Co-operation with Developing Countries, which on 24 No-
vember 1964 had instructed Mr. Armengaud to prepare a draft Opinion on the 
subject, examined the working paper at its meeting of 22 Apri11966. 
At this meeting the draft Opinion prepared by Mr. Armengaud was perused 
and unanimously adopted. 
The following were present: Mr. Thorn, Chairman; Mr. Carcassonne, Vice-Chair-
man; Mr. Armengaud, Drafter; Messrs. Battaglia, Bernasconi, Charpentier, Du-
pont, de Lipkowski, Metzger, Petre, Scarascia-Mugnozza and Wohlfart. 
. I. Introduction 
1. On 18 June 1964 the European Parliament 
decided to make a searching study of the pro-
blem of stabilizing world primary-commodity 
markets. This decision reflected the importance 
it attaches to defining a Community policy for 
assisting economically less-developed countries 
with a view to counteracting the instability of 
prices of tropical agricultural products and the 
persistent fall of primary-commodity prices. 
A few months later the Parliament for the 
first time set forth its view on the problems 
posed for the European Community by the 
World Conference on Trade and Development 
held at Geneva between 23 March and 16 June 
1964. On 19 October 1964, in the light of a re-
port submitted by Mr. Pedini, (1) the Parliament 
adopted a resolution in which it deplored the 
fact that the standpoints of the EEC Member 
States had not been properly co-ordinated, and 
warned that the lack of a common approach by 
the Six could seriously impair the smooth de-
velopment of world trade. 
The Parliament also stressed the urgent need 
to lay down principles for a common trade 
(1) Doc. 83 of 16 October 1964. 
policy to guide the Community in the sphere of 
international economic co-operation, and to pur-
sue a Community policy towards developing 
countries. 
2. Moreover, in a resolution adopted on 23 
November 1965 following the report submitted 
by Mr. Spenale, (1) the European Parliament 
again expressed its views on the subject, stating 
that: 
"It is the duty of the Community, as the 
biggest importer of tropical products in the 
world and as a signatory to the Convention 
of Association, to take steps with a view to 
planning and co-ordinating trade in primary-
commodities on a world scale." 
3. The significance of these first pronounce-
ments by the European Parliament must be 
emphasized from the outset. It would be im-
possible to tackle the problems involved in 
carrying out the Geneva recommendations with-
out taking account of the views the Parliament 
has already expressed on this subject. 
(1) Report on the expansion of trade between the EEC 
and the Associated African and Malagasy States, Doc. 
100 of 22 November 1965. 
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II. Primary commodities at the Geneva 
Conference 
4. The problems attendant on the production 
and marketing of primary commodities were 
thrashed out at the Geneva Conference. Nine 
of the fifty-nine recommendations adopted by 
the Conference related to these pro):>lems, co-
vering: 
(i) the initiation of studies on the situation of 
the markets and on trends in trade in 
primary commodities; 
(ii) the adoption of measures for long- and 
short-term price stabilization, with special 
emphasis on the problem of the terms of 
trade; 
(iii) the preparation of a draft .general agree-
ment on primary commodities. 
5. During the debates the Conference esta-
blished that the major problem was that of de-
ciding between the removal of obstacles and 
the organization of markets. 
The developing countries had submitted a 
detailed liberalization programme intended for 
rapid implementation. The industrialized coun-
tries were divided over the best course to 
adopt: the English-speaking countries and 
EFTA favoured liberalization while the EEC 
Member States supported-though in varying 
degrees-the organization of markets. The Con-
ference finally agreed on a compromise under 
which the problem would be examined separa-
tely for each product and suitable solutions 
sought from case to case. 
6. In accordance with the decisions taken by 
the Conference, a number of institutions were 
set up and put into operation in 1965 for the 
purpose of pursuing the objectives it had laid 
down. Of these institutions, the "Trade and De-
velopment Council", a permanent organ of the 
Conference with its seat in Geneva, deserves 
special mention. 
Urged on by the permanent Secretariat, 
headed by Mr. Prebisch, Secretary-General of 
the 1964 Conference, these institutions have al-
ready done much to pave the way for the next 
meeting of the Conference which, as an organ 
of the UN General Assembly, has already been 
established as a permanent institution. 
7. Before looking further into the current 
position, a word should be said about the atti-
tude .adopted by the Community at Geneva. 
The problem of co-ordinating the standpoints 
of Member States wa_s dealt with in special de-
bates of the EEC Council during its sessions of 
9-10 March 1964 and 1-2 June 1964. 
The Council had decided that Member States 
should bring their attitudes into line throughout 
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the Conference so as to ensure a common ap-
proach or at least co-ordinated viewpoints. The 
general lines of approach laid down at the time 
by the Council included "basic agreement on the 
need to stabilize primary commodity prices at 
a level remunerative for the producer coun-
tries". (1) 
The Community's attitude to these questions 
was outlined at Geneva by Mr. Brasseur, Belgian 
Minister for External Trade and President in 
office of the EEC Council, speaking on behalf 
of the six Member States: 
"The Community is aware of the fact that 
the developing countries have not always 
derived full benefit from increases in ton-
nages exported, owing to price movements. 
This is why the Community-as it has al-
ready pointed out in other quarters-is in 
favour, as a matter of principle, of stabilizing 
primary commodity prices at a level that is 
sufficiently remunerative for the producer 
countries. If all the countries attending the 
Conference could agree to this, a decisive 
step would have been taken in the right 
direction. 
Certain limits are of course set to stabili-
zation. The first essential is to prevent over-
production from nullifying any support it 
may be desired to provide. Secondly, we must 
not lose sight of the essential problem of 
diversifying production which is of far geat-
er importance for many developing coun-
tries. Finally, we must refrain from encour-
aging the use of substitutes, although tech-
nical progress and its inevitable consequen-
ces call for a realistic approach to this pro-
blem. 
In the light of these considerations the Com-
munity is ready to take an active part in the 
search for suitable measures to bring about 
the stabilization of primary commodity pri-
ces desired by the developing countries." 
8. The importance of the position taken up by 
the Community is not to be underrated. It shows 
that the Six have accepted the need for rational 
organization of world markets with a view to 
stabilizing the prices of priffiary commodities. 
This agreement must serve as the basis for any 
attempts to lay down the policy which the 
Community and its Member States should pursue 
in this sphere within the new international insti-
tutions for trade and development. 
III. The problem of primary commodities within 
the context of the Yaounde Convention 
9. The provisions of Title I of the Yaounde 
Convention set a limit to the customs protection 
(1) See press release of 10 March 1964, Councils Doc. 381/64 
(AG 105). 
received by the Associated States within the 
range of the common external tariff, since prices 
higher than those ruling in world markets cannot 
be accorded them. Annex III of the Convention 
lays down that during the five years it remains 
in force the marketing of tropical products must 
be progressively adapted to world prices in ac-
cordance with a specific timetable. 
The protection afforded by the EEC's common 
external tariff to products of the associated coun-
tries is fairly limited. It varies from product to 
product and was fixed as follows for the :rp.ain 
ones: 
-coffee . 9·6 °/o 
-cocoa . 5·4 Ofo 
- fresh pineapples 9 Ofo 
-cloves . 15 0/o 
- coconuts (desiccated) 4 Ofo 
-nutmeg 15 Ofo 
-pepper 17 Ofo 
-vanilla 11·5 Ofo 
- tea (1) . 10·8 Ofo 
-palm oil 8 to 14 Ofo 
- groundnut oil, copra, palm 
kernels 5 to 15 Ofo 
On the other hand no preference exists for a 
whole series of products for which the EEC tariff 
provides for a nil-duty tariff. These include ores 
(tin, copper, nickel) rubber, cotton and oilseeds. 
For other products, such as rice and manioc, the 
preference granted under the common external 
tariff will be nullified by the introduction by the 
Community of a levy system which is intended 
to replace all other protective measures at the 
frontier. 
As a result of the custom that has grown up 
among exporters in most of the Associated States 
of selling on a privileged market that guarantees 
both outlets and selling prices of their products, 
these col,.Jntries are now faced with a host of 
difficulties which tend to reduce their competi-
tiveness. They are thus obliged to resort to a 
number of measures such as reducing selling 
prices, improving the. general appearance of their 
·goods, and penetrating into the markets of Mem-
ber States. The Community should back these 
efforts to become more competitive. Only thus 
can the Associated States (i) reap the benefit of 
tbeir tariff advantages and (ii) enhance their 
chances of competing with those developing 
countries which, never having enjoyed a system 
of guaranteed prices, have had to sell at world 
prices, which are often subject to fluctuations in 
demand, and have therefore been exposed to the 
consequences-stimulqting at times, but more 
often disastrous-of competition on the world 
market. 
(1) Customs duty on this product was suspended from 
1 January 1964 by agreement with the Associated States 
and in conjunction with a similar measure in the 
United Kingdom. 
10. The EEC's purchases of tropical primary 
commodities originating in the associated coun-
tries vary widely from one Member State to the 
other; however, since the Association has come 
into operation all Member States, and not only 
France, have gradually opened up their markets 
to their exports. 
The studies carried out by the European Par-
liament and the Parliamentary Conference of the 
Association have established that: (1) 
(a) the share of the Associated States in the 
world market for raw minerals is a small 
one; 
(b) there is a dicrepancy between the increase 
in the output of tropical primary commodities 
and the revenue derived from their export to 
industrialized countries; 
(c) certain products of the Associated States are 
exposed to competition from similar products 
of countries of the temperate zone, particu-
larly North America (e. g. American soya-
bean oil which competes with tropical oils). 
11. The relationship between exports of pri-
mary commodities and the revenue of the AASM 
is shown in the tables below. 
12. The figures for trade between the EEC 
and the Associated States show that the tariff 
preferences granted since the Yaounde Conven-
tion came into force have stimulated exports of 
the products of the Associated States into the 
EEC. France clearly remains, however, the major 
market for these countries, since the other EEC 
States obtain the bulk of their requirements of 
tropical primary commodities from non-asso-
ciated African countries or from Latin America. 
The volume of trade between the EEC and 
the Associated States was reduced as a result of 
the fall in prices of primary commodities. Thus, 
the value of imports from some important sup-
plier countries of the EEC fell during the first 
half of 1965 below that for the same period in 
1964. World cocoa prices fell from $500 to $300 
per ton during the first half of 1965, after rising 
from $ 520 to $ 550 per ton during the first half 
of 1964. (2) 
(1) See report by Mr. van der Goes van Naters on the 
co-ordination of bilateral aid between the Member 
States of the EEC and the AASM (Doc. 77 of 9. 11. 
1964)and note by Messrs. Peyrefitte and Armengaud on 
the stabilization of the prices of primary commodities 
from overseas-PE 8437 of October 1960). 
(2) More recent figures show that cocoa prices have fallen 
as follows: 
(French francs per.soo g) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
2.141 1.77 1.37 1.09 1.02 1.22 1.13 0.77 
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Exports of primary commodities from the Associated States 1958/1963 (metric tons) 
Ground Nuts (kernels and oil) 
Congo Cen- Congo 
Senegal Ivory Upper Daho- Niger Gabon (Brazza- tral Chad Mada- Came- Togo (Leo- Revenue Coast Volta mey ville) Africa gascar roon pold- ($ 1000) 
ville) 
1958 436,888 588 3,286 15,617 88,342 477 1,731 2,135 1,768 562 14,681 3,444 6,516 138,238 
1959 401,902 120 2,074 3,621 57,673 259 1,251 2,066 1,093 - 6,635 224 6,398 106,510 
1960 367,384 104 479 15,407 55,574 96 2,220 1,773 976 - 3,598 1,571 5,267 100,866 
1961 453,433 248 564 12,522 68,198 279 1,039 1,268 304 78 9,924 3,371 76 115,190 
1962 395,269 
-
1,112 4,303 71,488 134 310 891 414 7,809 1,840 - 108,772 
1963 306,746 2,579 3,196 6,593 88,293 148 208 639 1,779 143 17,719 2,809 
-
97,874 
Palm Kernels 
Ivory Congo Central Congo Revenue Senegal Coast Dahomey (Brazza- Africa Cameroon Togo (Leopold- ($ 1000) ville) ville) 
1958 2,297 17,255 60,044 7,116 804 12,966 12,057 39,145 18,836 
1959 2,975 14,611 43,801 6,229 818 22,568 8,077 39,294 20,208 
1960 4,181 16,354 61,274 6,514 1,185 15,301 14,182 20,399 20,588 
1961 5,339 12,487 48,482 6,102 969 14,564 11,140 12,764 12,697 
1962 5,587 10,696 43,901 7,717 912 11,995 10,400 18,851 11,879 
1963 4,000 10,441 50,558 9,656 1,230 14,572 12,748 2,996 13,430 
Coffee 
Ivory Congo Central Mada- Congo Revenue 
Coast Dahomey Gabon (Brazza- Africa gascar Cameroon Togo (Leopold- Rwanda ($ 1000) ville) ville) 
1958 112,525 461 171 82 5,143 47,821 26,485 4,560 71,130 - 215,846 
1959 104,784 1,269 142 132 5,869 37,932 29,491 11,558 91,774 - 182,781 
1960 147,596 850 263 302 5,920 40,220 30,512 4,393 60,568 - 156,296 
1961 154,706 2,050 467 678 7,269 39,811 35,498 10,230 33,925 - 149,494 
1962 144,764 1,728 625 1,069 7,887 56,035 38,118 11,541 32,378 - 155,121 
1963 182,788 1,002 647 643 5,778 44,395 40,099 6,223 46,403 5,700 181,436 
Cocoa 
Ivory Congo Mada- Congo Revenue Gabon (Brazza- Cameroon Togo (Leopold-Coast ville) gascar ville) ($ 1000) 
1958 46,333 2,366 289 322 54,403 6,917 4,924 88,960 
1959 63,263 2,513 392 229 53,357 8,362 3,775 91,990 
1960 62,896 3,325 521 344 58,898 9,414 5,156 79,080 
1961 88,467 3,186 738 435 58,302 11,534 4,984 74,463 
1962 101,018 3,361 829 338 59,938 11,079 5,907 77,406 
1963 99,728 2,946 897 407 71,236 10,263 5,966 93,163 
Manioc Flour 
Congo 
Dahomey Central Madagascar Revenue (Leopold- Togo Cameroon Ivory Cost Africa ($ 1000) 
ville) 
1958 41,117 - - - - - - -
1959 49,865 1,772 - - - - - -
1960 26,411 5,349 - - 10 - - 463 
1961 - 3,326 - - 23 - - 511 
1962 2,010 562 20 
- 168 12 31 234 
1963 120 357 12 150 123 
- - 107 
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received by the Associated States within the 
range of the common external tariff, since prices 
higher than those ruling in world markets cannot 
be accorded them. Annex III of the Convention 
lays down that during the five years it remains 
in force the marketing of tropical products must 
be progressively adapted to world prices in ac-
cordance with a specific timetable. 
The protection afforded by the EEC's common 
external tariff to products of the associated coun-
tries is fairly limited. It varies from product to 
product and was fixed as follows for the :rp.ain 
ones: 
- coffee . 
- cocoa . 
- fresh pineapples 
-cloves . 
- coconuts (desiccated) 
-nutmeg 
-pepper 
-vanilla 
- tea (1) . 
~palm oil 
- groundnut oil, copra, palm 
kernels 
8 to 
5 to 
9·6 Ofo 
5·4 Ofo 
9 Ofo 
15 Ofo 
4 O/o 
15 Ofo 
17 Ofo 
11·5 Ofo 
10·8 Ofo 
14 Ofo 
15 Ofo 
On the other hand no preference exists for a 
whole series of products for which the EEC tariff 
provides for a nil-duty tariff. These include ores 
(tin, copper, nickel) rubber, cotton and oilseeds. 
For other products, such as rice and manioc, the 
preference granted under the common external 
tariff will be nullified by the introduction by the 
Community of a levy system which is intended 
to replace all other protective measures at the 
frontier. 
As a result of the custom that has grown up 
among exporters in most of the Associated States 
of selling on a privileged market that guarantees 
both outlets and selling prices of their products, 
these co'ijntries are now faced with a host of 
difficulties which tend to reduce their competi-
tiveness. They are thus obliged to resort to a 
number of measures such as reducing selling 
prices, improving the general appearance of their 
·goods, and penetrating into the markets of Mem-
ber States. The Community should back these 
efforts to become more competitive. Only thus 
can the Associated States (i) reap the benefit of 
tbeir tariff advantages and (ii) enhance their 
chances of competing with those developing 
countries which, never having enjoyed a system 
of guaranteed prices, have had to sell at world 
prices, which are often subject to fluctuations in 
demand, and have therefore been exposed to the 
consequences-stimulqting at times, but more 
often disastrous-of competition on the world 
market. 
(I) Customs duty on this product was suspended from 
1 January 1964 by agreement with the Associated States 
and in conjunction with a similar measure in the 
United Kingdom. 
10. The EEC's purchases of tropical primary 
commodities originating in the associated coun-
tries vary widely from one Member State to the 
other; however, since the Association has come 
into operation all Member States, and not only 
France, have gradually opened up their markets 
to their exports. 
The studies carried out by the European Par-
liament and the Parliamentary Conference of the 
Association have established that: (1) 
(a) the share of the Associated States in the 
world market for raw minerals is a small 
one; 
(b) there is a dicrepancy between the increase 
in the output of tropical primary commodities 
and the revenue derived from their export to 
industrialized countries; 
(c) certain products of the Associated States are 
exposed to competition from similar products 
of countries of the temperate zone, particu-
larly North America (e.g. American soya-
bean oil which competes with tropical oils). 
11. The relationship between exports of pri-
mary commodities and the revenue of the AASM 
is shown in the tables below. 
12. The figures for trade between the· EEC 
and the Associated States show that the tariff 
preferences granted since the Yaounde Conven-
tion came into force have stimulated exports of 
the products of the Associated States into the 
EEC. France clearly remains, however, the major 
market for these countries, since the other EEC 
States obtain the bulk of their requirements of 
tropical primary commodities from non-asso-
ciated African countries or from Latin America. 
The volume of trade between the EEC and 
the Associated States was reduced as a result of 
the fall in prices of primary commodities. Thus, 
the value of imports from some important sup-
plier countries of the EEC fell during the first 
half of 1965 below that for the same period in 
1964. World cocoa prices fell from $500 to $300 
per ton during the first half of 1965, after rising 
from $ 520 to $ 550 per ton during the first half 
of 1964. (2) 
(I) See report by Mr. van der Goes van Naters on the 
co-ordination of bilateral aid between the Member 
States of the EEC and the AASM (Doc. 77 of 9. 11. 
1964)and note by Messrs. Peyrefitte and Armengaud on 
the stabilization of the prices of primary commodities 
from overseas-PE 8437 of October 1960). 
(2) More recent figures show that cocoa prices have fallen 
as follows: 
(French francs per_SOO g) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
2.141 1.77 1.37 1.09 1.02 1.22 1.13 0.77 
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Exports of primary commodities from the Associated States 1958/1963 (metric tons) 
Ground Nuts (kernels and oil) 
Upper Daho- Congo Cen-
Congo 
Senegal Ivory Niger Gabon (Brazza- tral Chad Mada- Came- Togo (Leo- Revenue Coast Volta mey ville) Africa gascar roon pold- ($ 1000) 
ville) 
1958 436,888 588 3,286 15,617 88,342 477 1,731 2,135 1,768 562 14,681 3,444 6,516 138,238 
1959 401,902 120 2,074 3,621 57,673 259 1,251 2,066 1,093 
- 6,635 224 6,398 106,510 
1960 367,384 104 479 15,407 55,574 96 2,220 1,773 976 - 3,598 1,571 5,267 100,866 
1961 453,433 248 564 12,522 68,198 279 1,039 1,268 304 78 9,924 3,371 76 115,190 
1962 395,269 - 1,112 4,303 71,488 134 310 891 414 7,809 1,840 
-
108,772 
1963 306,746 2,579 3,196 6,593 88,293 148 208 639 1,779 143 17,719 2,809 
-
97,874 
Palm Kernels 
Ivory Congo Central Congo Revenue Senegal Coast Dahomey (Brazza- Africa Cameroon Togo (Leopold- ($ 1000) ville) ville) 
1958 2,297 17,255 60,044 7,116 804 12,966 12,057 39,145 18,836 
1959 2,975 14,611 43,801 6,229 818 22,568 8,077 39,294 20,208 
1960 4,181 16,354 61,274 6,514 1,185 15,301 14,182 20,399 20,588 
1961 5,339 12,487 48,482 6,102 969 14,564 11,140 12,764 12,697 
1962 5,587 10,696 43,901 7,717 912 11,995 10,400 18,851 11,879 
1963 4,000 10,441 50,558 9,656 1,230 14,572 12,748 2,996 13,430 
Coffee 
Ivory Congo Central Mada- Congo Revenue 
Coast Dahomey Gabon (Brazza- Africa gascar Cameroon Togo (Leopold- Rwanda ($ 1000) ville) ville) 
1958 112,525 461 171 82 5,143 47,821 26,485 4,560 71,130 
-
215,846 
1959 104,784 1,269 142 132 5,869 37,932 29,491 11,558 91,774 - 182,781 
1960 147,596 850 263 302 5,920 40,220 30,512 4,393 60,568 - 156,296 
1961 154,706 2,050 467 678 7,269 39,811 35,498 10,230 33,925 - 149,494 
1962 144,764 1,728 625 1,069 7,887 56,035 38,118 11,541 32,378 - 155,121 
1963 182,788 1,002 647 643 5,778 44,395 40,099 6,223 46,403 5,700 181,436 
Cocoa 
Ivory Congo Mada- Congo Revenue 
Coast Gabon (Brazza- gascar Cameroon Togo (Leopold- ($ 1000) ville) ville) 
1958 46,333 2,366 289 322 54,403 6,917 4,924 88,960 
1959 63,263 2,513 392 229 53,357 8,362 3,775 91,990 
1960 62,896 3,325 521 344 58,898 9,414 5,156 79,080 
1961 88,467 3,186 738 435 58,302 11,534 4,984 74,463 
1962 101,018 3,361 829 338 59,938 11,079 5,907 77,406 
1963 99,728 2,946 897 407 71,236 10,263 5,966 93,163 
Manioc Flour 
Congo Central Revenue (Leopold- Togo Cameroon Ivory Cost Dahomey Africa Madagascar ($ 1000) 
ville) 
1958 41,117 - - - - - - -
1959 49,865 1,772 - - - - - -
1960 26,411 5,349 - - 10 - - 463 
1961 
- 3,326 - - 23 - - 511 
1962 2,010 562 20 
- 168 12 31 234 
1963 120 357 12 150 123 - - 107 
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Cotton 
Ivory Upper Daho- Congo Central Mada- Congo Revenue Mali (Brazza- Chad Cameroon Togo (Leopold- Somalia Coast Volta mey ville) Africa gascar ville) ($ 1000) 
1958 - 75 916 778 - 11,174 26,047 311 6,954 1,748 34,442 1,073 57,082 
1959 - - 872 764 - 16,108 24,413 446 7,819 1,918 49,971 843 55,153 
1960 - 18 840 874 - 10,797 14,402 679 7,349 3,178 41,504 984 41,952 
1961 - 71 3 1,330 - 10,440 30,409 950 10,308 2,433 15,221 950 40,813 
1962 2,929 - 707 655 - 8,107 20,122 762 12,510 1,912 9,400 864 30,940 
1963 8,294 1,040 1,189 1,425 12 9,769 31,161 318 14,891 2,751 8,809 247 40,520 
Iron Ore 
1963: Mauritania 1,315,000 tons 
Manganese Ore 
Gabon Congo Congo Ivory Coast Madagascar (Brazzaville) (Leopoldville) 
1958 - - 318,754 - -
1959 73 - 302,397 22,724 200 
1960 14 - - 109,414 378 
1961 - - - 97,559 -
1962 21,020 15,000 294,996 105,301 -
1963 603,673 - 221,872 - -
Petroleum (crude and refined) 
Gabon Congo Congo (Brazzaville) (Leopoldvllle) 
1958 -
- -
1959 780,778 - 13 
1960 775,110 33,653 -
1961 737,808 93,425 -
1962 817,672 135,007 -
1963 943,777 101,060 -
Timber (in the rough and processed) 
Ivory Coast Gabon Congo Central Cameroon Congo Revenue (Brazzaville) Africa (Leopold ville) ($ 1000) 
1958 402,269 632,172 188,880 3,524 152,348 118,116 64,371 
1959 444,134 652,522 209,850 6,442 139,974 116,432 59,237 
1960 654,478 742,531 266,105 8,152 139,285 111,144 74,850 
1961 766,997 759,250 265,188 6,036 148,310 97,664 85,314 
1962 601,563 694,388 296,174 15,333 152,862 84,339 77,141 
1963 839,453 715,765 315,542 10,010 190,541 122,779 94,266 
The average price of Robusta coffee during 
the same period in 1965 was $ 600 per ton, 30 Ofo 
less than in the first half of 1964. These falling 
prices considerably reduce the revenue of pro-
ducer countries. 
Associated States in respect of inadequate re-
venue from their exports to the Community and 
of the obligation laid upon them gradually to 
line op the prices of their products to those rul-
ing on the world market. 
13. Under the Yaounde Convention the EEC 
must provide financial compensation to the 
Such compensation is however limited both 
in volume (730 million units of account, made 
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up of 620 million u. a. in the form of non-re-
payable aid and 110 million in the form of 
loans) and in duration (five years from 1 June 
1964). The amount involved is negligible in com-
parison with the revenue that would be derived 
by the Associated States from regular purchases 
of their primary comiiJ.odities at remunerative 
prices. 
As a result of this situation, certain Asso-
ciated States are making a great effort to over-
haul their economic structure in the hope of 
making a swift passage from a subsistence eco-
nomy .to a market economy. If, however, the 
drive for productivity and quality producers 
are expected to make does not lead to an in-
crease in their revenue-owing to competition 
from other producer countries to which their 
products are then constantly exposed-the Afri-
can farmer will soon desist from making the 
extra effort to earn more money and revert to 
the customs of his forefathers. Any deterioration 
in the terms of trade will thus tend to hamper 
the structural changes needed if the Associated 
States are to move steadily forward and extri-
cate themselves from a state of financial in-
security. 
The Associated States have never made a 
secret of the fact that they wish to finance their 
expansion with revenue earned from sales of 
their products on the EEC market. As early as 
1961 the African parliamentarians, meeting at 
Ouagadougou prior to the Parliamentary Con-
ference at Strasbourg, stressed the importance 
of planned development based on the widening 
of outlets for products of the Associated States 
produced in larger quantities and with enhanced 
quality. They also underlined the need to find 
suitable means of stabilizing prices of tropical 
products at a reasonable level so that the re-
venue of the Associated States was not subject-
ed to unduly wide fluctuations liable to upset 
the balance of their economy. 
During their first meeting within the insti-
tutional framework of the Association parlia-
mentarians from Europe, Africa and Madagascar 
again expressed their views clearly on this ques-
tion. The Parliamentary Conference at Dakar 
(December 1964) recommended: 
"that the EEC Member States should intro-
duce a common policy aimed at increasing 
purchases of primary commodities from the 
Associated States and thus raising their re-
venue~ 
that they should not allow the pricing of 
commodities whose prices are subject to 
wide fluctuations to be determined purely by 
the interplay of supply and demand; 
that the Associated States should try to in-
troduce a form of regional planning, ensuring 
rational division of effort and of commodi-
ties produced, in the light of the natural 
resources of each country." 
In other words, the Parliamentary Confe-
rence called for a policy of economic co-opera-
tion between the Associated States and the EEC 
Member States-at least in respect of products 
of the Associated States imported into the EEC 
-with a view to planning and co-ordinating 
production and avoiding confusion on their mar-
kets. 
14. So far the EEC Member States have not 
given the impression of considering themselves 
jointly bound by the wish thus expressed by 
the parliamentarians. They ought not to forget, 
however, the formal commitment entered into 
by them on 20 July 1963 at Yaounde with the 
signing of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention of 
Association. 
Under this Protocol the members of the As-
sociation have agreed to take account of their 
mutual interests at international level, and to 
this end to consult each other "in particular 
with a view to initiating appropriate action by 
common accord at international level to resolve 
the problems raised by the marketing and dis-
posal of tropical products". 
There is no doubt as to how this text should 
be interpreted. It imposes a clear obligation 
which is binding on all EEC Member States and 
enables us to declare, for example, that the re-
servations recently made by certain Member 
States regarding the proposals of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) concerning the conclusion of an in-
ternational agreement on cocoa are imcom-
patible with the commitments entered into at 
Yaounde. (1). 
We should not however lose sight of the im-
portance in certain areas of substitutes that 
compete with the primary commodities of the 
AASM. Mr. Brasseur was speaking on behalf of 
the Community as a whole when he remarked 
at the Geneva Conference in March 1964 that: 
"We should refrain from encouraging the 
use of substitutes, although technical pro-
gress and its inevitable consequences call for 
a realistic approach to this problem." 
What precise significance does the Community 
attach to this declaration of intent? How far are 
the Six prepared to go towards honouring the 
recommendation made by the President in office 
of the Council of Ministers before the represen-
tatives of all the developing countries? To what 
extent do the Six consider it desirable to limit 
production of synthetic products or substitutes 
(1) On 18 March those Associated States which are cocoa 
producers asked the EEC, within the Association Com-
mittee, to back them in the current negotiations in 
UNCTAD for an international agreement· on cocoa. 
that compete with cotton or rubber? Does not 
the fact that technical progress is here to stay 
favour the development of synthetic products? 
In the light of these present-day circumstances, 
this problem should be tackled within the Asso-
ciation before it is referred to international 
institutions, so as to avoid pursuing a policy for 
the cultivation of products which the industria-
lized countries are increasingly reluctant to buy. 
This appears to be all the more urgent in view of 
the fact that various Associated States, in the 
light of the diversification of production provided 
for in the Yaounde Convention, have worked out 
programmes for the cultivation of new crops, or 
for the expansion of existing cotton and, more 
particulary, rubber plantations. (1) 
It is highly desirable that production-parti-
cularly of cotton and rubber-should be properly 
planned so as to take future demand into 
account. Estimates should be drawn up right 
away so that the efforts made by producer 
countries to diversify their crops will not lead 
to results as disappointingly unremunerative as 
those achieved in the cultivation of their tradi-
tional primary commodities. 
15. All these problems should be carefully 
investigated within the Association itself. 
It is worth noting in this connexion that at 
the Geneva Conference the French Delegation 
showed that the competition whiCh the products 
of the developing countries met from the 
industrialized countries led to the rich countries 
becoming richer, and the poor countries poorer. 
The whole point of development aid, on the other 
hand, lay in the poor countries' sharing in the 
prosperity of the more fortunate ones. The dele-
gation therefore felt that the industrialized 
countries should enter into formal obligations 
vis-a-vis the poorer countries. 
All the more regrettable, therefore, are the 
terms of the Geneva Conference resolution, the 
unanimous adoption of which did little to conceal 
its ineffectiveness. 
IV. Proposed solutions 
16. The working document prepared by the 
External Trade Committee rightly stresses the 
need for the EEC to define and put into effect 
(1) Particularly in Cameroon, a ·large cotton producer 
which intends shortly to produce more than 60,000 
metric tons of seed-cotton a year. Cotton is North 
Cameroon's chief source of revenue and its most im-
portant trading product. This country is also expand-
ing production of rubber and intends in the next few 
years to invest 3,000m. CFA francs (~ 60m. French 
francs) on the cultivation of 6,000 hectares (about 15,000 
acres) of rubber trees. 
The Ivory Coast is also expanding its rubber planta-
tions and intends to produce 7 to 8,000 tons of latex 
in the next few years. Similarly, Mali increased its 
production of seed-cotton between 1961 and 1962 by 
68°/o. Finally, cotton is Chad's only industrial crop, 
production being about 100,000 tons of seed-cotton a 
year, a figure it is proposed to increase still further. 
a common trade policy through which it could 
exercise considerable influence on world trade. 
The urgency of such a step is borne out by 
the mounting trade policy problems connected 
with development which are now being systema-
tically studied in new institutions in which the 
European Community is to be represented. While, 
therefore, a common trade policy is essential, it 
is a matter of even greater urgency to define 
those aspects of such a policy that have a direct 
bearing on the developing countries. 
Greater efforts must therefore be made at 
Community level to lay down the basis for a 
co-ordinated approach by Member States in the 
new international institutions for trade and 
development which have been set up in Geneva 
and on which the Community, too, should be 
represented. 
17. As regards the content of such a trade 
policy for aid and development, the Six formally 
decided in the EEC Council on 10 March 1964 in 
favour of stabilizing primary commodity prices 
at a remunerative level. 
The question raised by the External Trade 
Committee has therefore already met with a 
· reply: the Six are fully alive to the need to adopt 
a common approach to the problems that are 
being studied at Geneva. They have already 
accepted the principle of stabilization, realizing 
that the aid given by rich countries to those 
badly off, whatever its nature and extent, can 
never take the place-from the political, let alone 
the psychological point of view-of the revenue 
the developing countries could earn by selling 
the produce of their soil at remunerative prices. 
This decision, it must be emphasized, must 
now be put into effect. 
18. The Six, which together are the world's 
largest importer of tropical products, have a 
special responsibility in this respect, not least 
because of the obligation they have assumed 
under Protocol No.4 to the Yaounde Convention. 
They have already accepted in principle the need 
for organizing primary commodity markets. It 
now only remains for them to take the appro-
priate action, and in particular to hammer out, 
jointly with the EEC Commission, ways and 
means of putting these policy aims into effect. 
In this way the Six Member States would 
emerge from the present state of uncertainty 
and share constructively in the work of UNCTAD, 
thus disposing of the criticisms-often justi-
fied-at present levelled at them by many 
developing countries. 
19. The document submitted "by the External 
Trade Committee puts forward the following 
measures as a first step towards a solution: 
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(a) compensatory payments to offset losses of 
revenue resulting from reduced purchases 
by the industrialized countries, or from a fall 
in prices; 
(b) the application of the newly-added Chap-
ter IV of GATT on the removal of obstacles 
of all kinds that hamper imports into 
industrialized countries of primary commo-
dities and processed products from the 
developing countries. 
The signing by all the Member States of such 
an amendment to the GATT provisions would of 
course ensure the adoption of a common approach 
throughout the Community. Certain doubts may 
however be expressed as to the soundness of the 
proposals concerned. 
The free trade at which GATT is a1mmg is 
hardly compatible with the behaviour of the 
countries that advocate it. On the domestic 
market the United States pursues a rigidly pro-
tectionist policy and supports farmers by means 
of financing organizations, such as the Com-
modity Credit Corporation, which have consider-
able funds at their disposal. These are used to 
guarantee prices and to finance in advance, or 
even store, crops for which the producers have 
received payment. To harp on the virtues of 
GATT thus appears to be either a nai:ve or some-
what suspect proceeding. 
This impression becomes all the stronger 
when it is remembered that the European States 
themselves have for years constantly protected 
certain branches of agriculture, at times to 
·excess, and in doing so have violated-though on 
socially justifiable grounds-the precepts of a 
'liberal market economy which they set up as a 
model for world trade. The protection given to 
cereals in France and Germany is a case in point. 
20. It is of course inconsistent to advocate 
trade on equal terms simultaneously with meas-
ures intended to expand the economies of less 
favoured countries. 
In this sector of customs tariffs it is impractic-
able to demand equality for all with a view to 
favouring the weakest. The only bodies that are 
doing a useful job here are indeed the regional 
organizations with their mutual preferences. 
The answer to the criticisms levelled by 
certain third countries at the regional system of 
the Yaounde Convention is that the real contra-
diction lies in maintaining that there should be 
equality of preference and that the developing 
countries will benefit if all are treated alike. For 
the developing countries unrestricted free trade 
has always spelt the weakening of their econo-
mies since it exposes them to competition from 
which the industrialized purchasing countries 
benefit. 
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If one declines to take these considerations 
into account there is a risk that the African 
countries, discouraged by the inability of the 
West to grasp the real nature of their problems, 
or to apply to these countries the policy it 
pursues regarding its own suitably protected 
products, may acquire a taste for other forms of 
civilization and thus be drawn into other political 
ambits. At Geneva these countries declared they 
were willing to adjust their production by stages 
to normal world market conditions, which are 
still far removed from the level of surplus 
prices or of excessive support prices. This gap 
can never be closed, however, unless prices of 
tropical primary commodities cease to decline. 
In short, countries that are enjoying preferences 
will find it very difficult to surrender them 
unless other equivalent advantages are accorded 
them. 
21. Under the existing system of preferences 
between the signatories to the Yaounde Conven-
tion, the EEC must expand trade with its African 
and Malagasy partners in accordance with 
Article 1 and Annex VIII of the Convention. 
Moreover the Association could form an 
effective means of ensuring more stable prices 
for certain products of the associated countries. 
In the present state of the Treaties it would 
doubtless be difficult to extend to the Six as a 
whole the system of stabilization funds and 
guaranteed sales existing under the bilateral 
relations between France and the States of the 
French franc area. It would perhaps be easier to 
set up African marketing boards for each product 
on the lines of those operating in English-
speaking Africa. Although these are not mention-
ed in the Yaounde Convention, they are not in 
principle excluded. Such boards are mainly 
financed by the producers, who pay a levy in 
respect of prices above the reference level and 
receive a compensatory payment when market 
prices are below. 
Agreements for individual products, such as 
those in force for tin and coffee, could be 
considered for major African products subject to 
wide fluctuations in price, i.e. cocoa, groundnuts 
and palm kernels, to ensure that production does 
not unduly exceed demand. 
On the other hand the preference accorded to 
the Associated States' products-at present so 
slight that the price for soya bean surpluses can 
reduce it to nil for fats-could be increased so as 
to enable a fund. to be formed to aid African 
producers when there is a fall in the price of 
their products. This presupposes that the provi-
sions regarding the levy on imports of cereals 
into the EEC should be extended to the products 
of the Associated States and to their domestic 
substitutes (e. g. soya beans instead of ground-
nuts), or that a specific Community tax should 
be levied at the consumer's expense before the 
processing or marketing stage. This would ensure 
that competition arising from prices due to 
dumping or liquidation of stocks would not 
reduce the earnings of producer countries. 
In determining the amount of the levy, three 
requirements must be taken into account: (i) the 
prices resulting from the levy must be accepted 
by the consumer; (ii) a ceiling must be fixed for 
African products so as to rule out the accumula-
tion of unsaleable stocks over and above emer-
gency reserves; (iii) products must be of un-
varying quality. The money accumulated in this 
way could be administered by a central fund 
managed by the producer countries themselves, 
part of the levy being of course used for the 
diversification of their economies. 
22. In this connexion it is interesting to see 
that twelve Associated States belonging to the 
French franc area have recently asked the EEC 
to collaborate in setting up a common organiza-
tion for the sugar market. 
CAMO (Common African and Malagasy Orga-
nization) is planning to organize the sugar 
market between its members, of which some-
e. g. Madagascar and Congo (Brazzaville)-are 
producers and others consumers. Price equali-
zation will ensure stable earnings at a reasonable 
level for producers and attractive prices for 
consumers. The Council of CAMO will each year 
fix a guaranteed price independent of that ruling 
on the world market so as to ensure an adequate 
return to the African sugar industry. Imports 
from third countries will be aligned to this price 
through the levy system, and the processing 
industry will be free to develop without being 
exposed to fluctuations in world prices, domestic 
output being insufficient to cover overall 
demand. 
These countries have up till now belonged to 
a market organized within the French franc 
area. (1) They do not want to be excluded from 
the organized EEC market as they fear exposure 
to the hazards of the world market. 
This goes to show what an important part the 
EEC can play, within the regional context of the 
Association, in tackling the problems arising 
from the marketing and disposal of primary 
commodities. · 
23. A start in this direction was made in the 
EEC Commission's proposal for a regulation 
governing oils and fats originating in the Asso-
ciated States. (2) Under this important proposal 
which, despite its urgency for those concerned, 
has unfortunately not yet been put into effect, 
financial aid will be given in respect of certain 
(1) Only 10 °/o of the sugar produced is at present marketed 
at world prices, the bulk being disposed of within 
organized markets. 
(2) See report by Mr. Aigner, Doc. 62 of 14 June 1965. 
oils and fats imported from the Associated 
countries when the price on the world market 
falls below the reference price. This aid will be 
financed by the EAGGF (European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund) from a levy on 
edible fats and oils. 
In this case, therefore, the EEC has realized 
that it can hardly set up a levy system to 
protect its own agricultural products while with-
holding the resulting benefits from producers in 
the Associated States. 
These provisions, however, have only a 
limited effect. They by no means reduce the risk 
of imports of soya beans from the United States; 
this continues to prevail because of the uniform 
quality of the product, the massive publicity 
campaign waged by organized producers, (1) and 
the tendency of the latter to set no limit on 
output. 
At the most these imports can be held in 
check by stepping up publicity of African oils 
(as France has done in the case of groundnuts). 
Something more than conventional commercial 
advertising is needed. The attention of consumers 
should be drawn to all the advantages offered by 
the products of the associated countries, among 
them security of supply, unvarying high quality, 
and the vastness of the distribution network. 
This calls for an effort both by African producers 
and by European and African processors, who 
should meet the cost of the campaign, if necessary 
with the help of the European Development 
Fund. 
The solution outlined above should be supple-
mented by commercial agreements between the 
European importers, framed in such a way as to 
ensure that the products of the associated 
countries receive contractual preference. {2) These 
agreements could cover sources of supply of 
specified quantities, purchase prices for African 
producers, and the creation of a fund jointly 
administered by importers and producers with a 
view to smoothing out fluctuations in prices. 
For their part, the Associated States would 
be well advised to replace the State collecting 
centres for certain primary commodities by joint 
companies or trading co-operatives which, parti-
cularly because of their contractual links with 
European importers, could lay their hands on 
funds for the advance financing-and perhaps 
the storage-of crops. 
(1) In 1966 exports of U.S. agricultural products were over 
$6,200m., the EEC providing the major outlet. Exports 
of oils and fats to France rose from $71m. in 1959 to 
$222m. in 1964. In 1965 the soya harvest in the USA 
yielded 23 million tons of beans, equivalent to about 
4 million tons of oil. EEC imports of soya oil-cakes 
from the United-States in 1965 were about double those 
for 1964. 
(2) This presupposes a generous interpretation of the rules 
of competition of the Treaty of Rome and of the 
regulations implementing them. 
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24. In its conclusions the working document 
of the External Trade Committee rightly insists 
on the need to establish international market 
organizations whose tasks should include co-
ordinating the national policies of the various 
countries. Such a solution would be warmly wel-
comed by the Committee for Co-operation with 
Developing Countries, especially in view of the 
attitude already taken by the European Parlia-
ment and referred to in Chapter I of this Opinion. 
The text prepared by the External Trade 
Committee appears however to refer mainly to 
agreements that could be concluded in the 
Kennedy Round and that relate, therefore, to 
agricultural products of the temperate zones. An 
effective aid policy for third countries calls how-
ever for special measures to expand trade in 
agricultural products from tropical regions. The 
Geneva Conference concerned itself mainly with 
primary commodities produced in the developing 
countries, with a view to increasing their con-
sumption and import in the developed countries. 
The steps taken by the Community with a 
view to concluding international agreements for 
primary commodities should therefore cover not 
only· agricultural products from the temperate 
zones which might have a bearing on its common 
agricultural policy, but also primary commodities 
exported by the developing countries. 
Such action should therefore be taken 
primarily within the new UNCTAD institutions, 
set up after the Geneva Conference, which have 
already, for example, put forward highly in-
teresting proposals for the conclusion of a new 
international agreement on cocoa. 
In line with the common approach to be 
adopted in the Geneva institutions, Member 
States should seize this first opportunity offered 
by the draft agreement on cocoa to show they 
are willing to take an active and constructive 
part in the work of UNCTAD. 
25. The Committee for Co-operation with 
Developing Countries welcomes the suggestion 
concerning compensatory financing contained in 
paragraph 157 of the document of the External 
Trade Committee. 
The system of "compensatory financing" for 
countries hit by the deterioration in the terms of 
trade-first proposed in 1954 in the United 
Nations (1)-was in 1961 made the subject of a 
searching study which provided for a sort of 
international mutual insurance under which the 
contributions of economically strong countries 
would go to benefit less developed ones. (2) 
(1) See "Commerce des produits de base et developpement 
economique", United Nations, 1954. 
(2) See "Mesures internationales destinees a compenser les 
fluctuations du commerce des produits de base·• 
United Nations, 1961. ' 
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It is difficult to assess the possibility of 
putting this proposal into effect. It should how-
ever receive careful attention from the EEC and 
Member States in the course of subsequent acti-
vities in UNCTAD. 
The External Trade Committee rightly points 
out that the European Community's attitude to 
this question can prove to be of considerable 
importance. However, compensatory aid must be 
planned in such a way as to fit into a system 
operating on lines similar to that of the agri-
cultural levy in the EEC. 
26. In its conclusions, the document of the 
External Trade Committee points out that the 
EEC is bound by the system of preferences set 
up under the Yaounde Convention. Moreover, it 
is emphasized that the Yaounde Association-
like the Community itself-is outward-looking, 
so that it is open to all developing countries to 
accept the advantages and obligations of the 
Association. 
The Community and the eighteen Associated 
African and Malagasy States have agreed to pool 
their efforts to solve the problem of trade in 
tropical products. This group of twenty-four 
countries can therefore play a major role in 
solving international economic problems. 
27. It would be idle however to discuss the 
outward-looking character of the Association if 
its present members-whether European or Afri-
can-fail to agree on a common policy and 
common means to enable them to stabilize the 
prices of tropical primary commodities and 
ensure outlets for AASM producers. The Associa-
tion would then not only fail to attract new 
members but fade away or collapse altogether, 
leaving behind it a trail of recrimination. 
It is therefore essential, without delay, to 
have a frank discussion with African members 
of the Association on the likely outlets for their 
products and the prospects for stabilizing prices 
therefor, with all the consequences this would 
entail. 
28. Finally, the Committee for Co-operation 
with Developing Countries expresses its concern 
regarding the instability of prices of tropical 
agricultural products and the continuous fall of 
primary commodity prices, and draws attention 
to the views expressed by. the European Parlia-
ment on the subject in its resolutions of 19 Octo-
ber 1964 (report by Mr. Pedini) and 23 November 
1965 (report by Mr. Spenale). 
On the strength of the arguments outlined in 
this Opinion, it feels that in the resolution it 
adopts after studying the report of the External 
Trade Committee, the Parliament should: 
(a) renew its backing for the decision taken by 
the EEC Council at its session of 9-10 March 
1964 to adopt, in principle, an approach 
favouring the stabilization of primary com-
modity prices at a level remunerative to 
producer countries, rejecting once and for all 
the sole play of supply and demand; 
(b) demand greater efforts at Community level 
to define a co-ordinated approach on the part 
of Member States in the new international 
institutions for trade and development, on 
the basis of regional preferences and finan-
cial compensation for fluctuations in prices; 
(c) demand that, as part of this co-ordinated 
approach, the Community should take steps 
to organize markets for agricultural primary 
products of tropical origin, with a view to 
improving at least the terms of trade for 
these products as against industrial products; 
(d) stress the special responsibility that falls in 
this sphere on the Community as the major 
importer of tropical products on the world 
market and as signatory to the Convention 
of Association with the African and Malagasy 
States; 
(e) recommend Member States to support every 
effort already being made at world level to 
organize the market for certain products, 
and particularly to adopt a positive attitude 
to the international agreement on cocoa; 
(f) draw attention to the significance of the 
moral obligations assumed by the Commu-
nity in this respect in Protocol No. 4 to the 
Convention, and 
(g) stress that, pending the results of the efforts 
undertaken within the context of the rela-
tions existing between the signatories to the 
Yaounde Convention-results which will also 
depend on the machinery set up by the EEC 
partners to deal with agricultural products-
the Community should forthwith promote 
co-ordinated expansion of trade with its 
African and Malagasy partners in accordance 
with the letter and spirit of the Yaounde 
Convention; 
(h) arrange for inclusion on the agenda of the 
next Parliamentary Conference of the Asso-
ciation of a searching discussion of the stabi-
lization of prices and outlets for the primary 
commodities of the Associated States. 
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